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Abstract 
Mirror neurones are cells in ventral promoter and inferior parietal cortex of the 
macaque monkey, that are active during the execution and observation of action. 
It is thought that mirror neurones serve to map observed actions onto their 
corresponding motor counterpart. There is no direct evidence for human mirror 
neurones. However, studies investigating action observation have demonstrated 
that human motor cortices are active during passive observation of motor events. 
Relatively little is known about the human mirror system. The experiments 
described here aimed to address this issue using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging. Using a paradigm guided by single cell recordings in macaque monkey, 
I demonstrated human mirror responses in bilateral premotor and parietal 
network and show that this network dissociates between transitive and 
intransitive action. These data are discussed in relation to simulation theory, 
which does not account for this observed dissociation 
I then investigated the possibility that the mirror response is a result of 
associations formed between actions that are commonly observed and executed 
at the same time (familiar object grasp) compared to actions that are not 
(unfamiliar object grasp). These data indicate a greater mirror response for 
unfamiliar object interactions and demonstrated that object familiarity is 
associated with changes in the parietal component of the mirror network. The 
final experiment investigated how agency is maintained during widespread 
common encoding of observed, active and passive movements. These data 
demonstrated that for simple finger movements, distinct regions in secondary 
somatosensory cortex encode the mirror response and discriminate between 
agents. 
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These data provide evidence for a human mirror system, and describe several 
properties of the system that have implications for current theories of mirror 
neurone function. I discuss these data in reference to existing literature and for 
future avenues of research in both healthy subjects and in clinical populations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The importance of being mobile; cortical control of visually 
guided reaching 
'I contend that a brain without motor functions could not think or at least that the 
continuity of mental functions is assured by corresponding motor functions.' 
Moshe Feldenkrais (Feldenkrais, 1964). 
Voluntary movement and its sensory consequences comprise a large part of the 
human conscious experience. Movement is the only way in which humans can 
interact with and influence their environment. The sensory feedback from 
movement is an important cue that one is conscious and aware. The 'locked-in' 
syndrome, when a stroke destroys motor pathways in the ventral pons, results in 
a dissociation of cognition from expression, other than very limited eye 
movements. Neuromuscular blockade with ventilation but no sedation results in 
complete inability to communicate or interact with the environment. Clearly 
memory and other higher cognitive processes continue to function under these 
circumstances, but the ability to move and receive reafferent feedback from the 
consequences of actions must, at some level, alter these processes. 
Until recently the prevailing view of the brain was based on theories of 
modularity. Even now. Science is prepared to publish a paper that attributes 
jealousy to a small volume of the cingulate cortex (Takahashi et al., 2009). At the 
level of early sensory and late motor processing, neophrenology has 
considerable validity. Thus, for example, anatomically distinct extrastriate visual 
cortical areas are specialised for particular aspects of visual perception, such as 
colour or motion (Bartels and Zeki, 2005). However, at another level, sensory 
distinctions breakdown. Therefore, for example, primary human auditory cortex 
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will respond to the visual percept of lips moving during speech (Calvert et al., 
1997). Over the last 50 years, there has been increasing evidence that motor 
cortices, responsible for action execution, are involved in action perception. In 
other words, it seems that regions of motor cortices are active during observation 
of a movement as well as during execution of that same movement (Fadiga et 
al., 1995; Grezes et al., 2003). 
This thesis describes experiments that were designed to investigate the system 
encoding both action execution and action perception. This chapter will critically 
assess the current literature in this field, and discuss what is known and not 
known in order to set the scene for the experiments I carried out. 
Action execution and action perception: two sides of the 
same coin? 
The versatility of the human hand has excited comment over centuries. As 
Aristotle noted '..the hand can become., a weapon or tool .. it can be everything 
because it has the ability to grasp anything..'. Indeed the ability to manipulate 
objects with such dexterity has contributed considerably to the success of the 
human race (Lemon, 1993). Nevertheless, monkeys can perform dexterous acts, 
such as picking up a peanut between thumb and forefinger, and they are also 
capable of modifying objects around them to use as tools to acquire food (Moura 
and Lee, 2004). Therefore, experiments on the cortical areas associated with 
action execution in the monkey might be expected to give information that relates 
to the human ability to reach, grasp and manipulate. 
Experiments in the non-human primate have revealed the existence of 
frontoparietal loops that are involved in visuomotor coordination; pathways that 
control reaching and grasping. These two actions are partly independent in that 
one can reach without grasping, and grasping can involve different shaping of the 
digits, depending on the size and shape of the object. This is reflected in the 
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neural organisation, as reaching and grasping are subserved by different 
frontoparietal pathways; 'reaching loops' are located dorsal and medial to those 
involved in grasping (Jeannerod et al., 1995; Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000). 
Evidence suggests that sensory information is stored in terms of object-related 
representations in anterior intraparietal sulcus (AlP) (Arbib, 1997). This 
information is Icnown as object affordance; the properties of an object that are 
encoded in sensory form which serve to provide information as to the function of 
the object (Fagg and Arbib, 1998). It was subsequently proposed that this region 
represents the transformation between the perceived object and the appropriate 
action. AlP is reciprocally connected with the premotor cortex and both are 
known to be important in the visual guidance of action. It is suggested that 
ventral premotor cortex (PMv) contains a 'motor vocabulary' for all motor 
schemata (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). This is based on the fact that direct stimulation 
of neurones in PMv can elicit entire grasping actions. The ventral premotor cortex 
is involved in selecting the grasping plan or schema appropriate to the shape and 
size of the object, supplied from visual cortex and processed through AlP. The 
appropriate schema is passed to dorsal premotor cortex (PMd). Multiple 
reciprocal frontoparietal loops exists between superior parietal areas and PMd, 
regions that appear to be central to the online control of reaching movements. 
Thus, PMd is involved in combining the visual feedback supplied to superior 
parietal areas with the selected motor schema. The integration of information 
from both PMv and PMd supplies the primary motor cortex with temporally and 
spatially segmented information for execution of the selected action (Figurel). 
15 
AlP: encodes 
object affbrdance PMd: Online control 
of nrovement RFC: Decision 
to move 
Medial loops for reaching 
PMv A 
Striate and 
extrastriate 
cortex Lateral loops for grasping 
PMv: Motor 
vocabulary 
STS: Observation of self and 
non-self produced action 
Figure 1. Motor circuits for voluntary movement in the macaque brain 
On execution of a voluntary movement a distributed network Is active in the 
macaque brain. The decision to move is encoded by the posterior parietal cortex 
and prefrontai cortex which are reciprocally connected. These two areas thus 
comprise the top of the motor hierarchy. Neurones in prefrontal cortex pass this 
decision onto neurones in premotor cortex, which are involved In motor planning. 
Visual information from striate (primary) and non-strlate (non-primary) visual 
cortices, is passed ventrally to the superior temporal sulcus (STS), which in a 
very general sense encodes information about the object, and dorsally to the 
parietal cortices encoding the location of the object or desired action. The parietal 
lobes, anterior intraparietal sulcus (AlP) in particular, are then involved in the 
spatial planning to the movement. For example neurones in this region are 
known to encode the target of an object, and the direction of a proposed action. 
Multiple frontoparietal loops exist which encode both reaching movements 
(dorsal frontoparietal loops) and grasping (medial frontoparietal loops). In 
premotor cortex this information is integrated with information from prefrontal 
cortex the final Instructions for action execution are passed posteriorly to primary 
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motor cortex. Here large pyramidal neurones (Betz cells) in layer V pass efferent 
instructions via the spinal cord where they synapse directly with motor neurones. 
It is suggested that there are three main types of neurones that reside in AlP 
(Cuiham et al., 2006): motor dominant, visual dominant and visuomotor 
neurones. Motor dominant neurones are effectively motor neurones in that they 
are active during action execution even in the absence of visual feedback. Visual 
dominant cells are active during perception of an object and during observation 
of one's own movement, but not during execution in the absence of visual 
feedback. Visuomotor neurones are active in all three conditions, but more so for 
movement with visual feedback than without feedback. Neurones in PMv (F5) are 
known to encode different directed actions such as grasping, tearing and holding 
(Rizzolatti et al., 1988). The precision grip, which involves opposing the thumb 
and forefinger, is the most well represented action in F5. The interaction between 
AlP and F5 is demonstrated by the effects of inactivation of one or other of these 
two areas with musicimol, which results in a very similar impairment of motor 
execution (Fogassi et al., 2001). 
Whilst it is clear that there are multiple direct pathways connecting posterior 
parietal and premotor cortices, studies carried out in the early 1960's 
demonstrated the presence of an alternative pathway between parietal and 
premotor cortices (Myers 1962, Haaxma and Kuypers, 1975). There is a 
subcortical route which projects from parietal cortex (and other regions of the 
cerebral cortex) via the pontine nucleus in the pons to the cerebellum, and is thus 
known as the cortico-ponto-cerebellar pathway. This pathway is extremely large 
in comparison to the pyramidal tract and constitutes one of the main influences of 
the cerebral cortex over the cerebellum. The cerebellum also projects to the 
motor cortices (and other regions of cerebral cortex) via the thalamus (Asanuma 
et al., 1983; Middleton et al., 1997; Thach et al., 1972), forming a closed cortico-
cerebellar-cortico loop. This loop forms an alternative, indirect route between 
parietal and frontal cortices. It is thought that this pathway plays a role in 
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monitoring of action and motor memory (Krupa et a!., 1993, Hardiman et a/., 
1996). In fact it is suggested that this tract is the source of the efference copy 
(see Ramnani, 2006), which is discussed later in this chapter. 
To summarise, multiple parallel frontoparietal and large subcortical cortico-
cerebellar-cortical loops underlie the execution of reaching-to-grasp movements. 
However, there is increasing evidence that executed and observed events may 
be commonly encoded in both human and non-human primate brain. A number 
of studies have demonstrated a remarkable overlap in brain regions responding 
during both action observation and action execution, observation of tactile 
stimulation and sensation of tactile stimulation, meaning of perceived action 
words (verbs) and action execution, and even memory retrieval and imagining 
the future. These experiments will be covered in more detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
It is well established that action observation can influence the execution of a 
subsequent action. For example, the latency to perform a correct grasping action 
is shorter when cued by visual presentation of a hand in the correct orientation 
compared to a rotated hand (Craighero et al., 2002). In contrast, observation of 
incongruent movements produces an interference effect (Kilner et al., 2003). 
Studies of eye movements during action observation indicate that subjects' 
saccades are predictive rather than reactive, implying that they are relying on 
their own motor programs to direct visual attention (Flanagan and Johansson, 
2003). Stefan and colleagues (2005) have demonstrated that repeated 
observation of an action was sufficient to influence subsequent actions. Following 
a single pulse of transcranial magnetic stimulation, which excites primary motor 
cortex, subjects' thumbs show a natural bias to move in one or two directions, 
abduction or adduction. If each subject then observed a video clip of a thumb 
moving repeatedly in the direction opposite to which they had a natural bias, 
subsequent TIVIS stimulation demonstrated a reversal of the previous thumb 
movement. Further evidence for the close link between perception and action 
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comes from studies of patients with frontoparietal lesions, in whom impairment of 
actions was accompanied by corresponding perceptual deficits (Pazzaglia et al., 
2008). This converging evidence, from experiments of very different design, 
implies a somewhat alien concept, namely that not only does action perception 
influence action execution but that action also influences perception. 
What might be the mechanism for this phenomenon? Over the last half a century 
accumulating evidence has implied that action execution and action observation 
may be commonly encoded in the human brain. At rest, neurones in primary 
sensory and motor cortices fire spontaneously in synchrony. This can be 
observed on electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings as a wave in the mu 
range. During the execution of an action, this spontaneous activity becomes 
desynchronised. This is thought to reflect the recruitment of a subset of sensory 
and motor neurones, specific to the execution of the task. This desynchronisation 
is seen on the EEG as suppression, or loss of power in, the mu wave spectrum. 
In 1954, two groups based in France simultaneously reported that this effect not 
only occurs in the absence of overt movement but also during observation of 
action (Cohen-Seat et al., 1954; Gastaut and Bert, 1954). This finding has been 
replicated a number of times (Cochin et al., 1998; Cochin et al., 1999). 
Observation of action also triggers facilitation of motor evoked potentials (IVIEPs) 
in the muscles involved in the observed movement (Fadiga et al., 1995; Strafella 
and Paus, 2000). These IVIEPs follow the corresponding temporal dynamics of 
the observed movement (Gangitano et al., 2001). Similar findings have been 
demonstrated by magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Han et al., 1998). Evidence 
from neuroimaging has supported these findings. In 1996, Rizzolatti and 
colleagues (1996) carried out a series of PET studies investigating action 
imitation, execution and observation. They demonstrated that passive 
observation of an object-directed grasp is associated with significant activity in 
middle temporal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus, located in Brodmann's 
areas (BA) 21 and 45. Since then a number of studies have confirmed this 
finding and, furthermore, demonstrated activity in premotor and parietal cortices 
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during action observation (Buccino et a!., 2001; Decety and Grezes, 1999; 
Decety et al., 1997; lacoboni et al., 2005; Manthey et a!., 2003). Together these 
studies provide compelling evidence that the human frontoparietal networks 
active during action execution are also active during observation of action. 
Mirror neurones: the substrate of common activity during 
action execution and action observation? 
In human brains it is widely assumed that the neural substrate of this overlap in 
action observation and action execution networks is due to the presence of mirror 
neurones; individual cells in macaque premotor and inferior parietal cortices that 
respond both during the execution and observation of an action (di Pellegrino et 
al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese et al., 1996) (Figure 2). 
F5:20% vtsuai 
(90% of these also 
respond during 
execution) 
60%visiial 
(65% of these also 
respond during 
execution) 
s PMv 
90% visual 
(None of these also 
respond during 
execution) 
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Figure 2. The macaque mirror neurone circuit 
Mirror neurones have been discovered in area PF of the infen'or parietal cortex 
and area F5 of the ventral premotor cortex of the macaque brain. These areas 
are reciprocally connected and receive input from the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS). Neurones in STS respond to observation of actions but not during 
execution of actions. These cells lack motor properties and therefore are not 
mirror neurones; however, they are believed to contribute to the frontoparietal 
mirror neurone circuit. Mirror neurones are defined by their behaviour; they fire 
during performance of an action and during obsen/ation of an action performed 
by a conspecific (a). The histograms and rasters show neuronal firing of mirror 
neurones in area F5. In this experiment the monkeys were trained to grasp a 
piece of food (figure a, right) and to remain still while the experimenter carried out 
the same action in front of them (figure a, left). The vertical bar represents the 
point at which the experimenter's hand touched the food. The mirror response in 
these particular mirror neurones was not present when interaction with the food 
involved a tool, such as a pair of pliers. This indicates that interaction between 
the object and a biological limb is important in triggering mirror neurone firing. 
Figures a and b are reproduced from the work of Rizzolatti and colleagues 
(2001). 
Despite the interest that the discovery of mirror neurones has sparl^ed in the field 
of human cognitive neuroscience, relatively little is known macaque mirror 
neurones. In fact, there are far more publications speculating about the potential 
functions of such a system than there are research papers investigating the 
properties of mirror neurones. During the experiments carried out throughout this 
thesis, it was considered essential to maintain a strict definition of a human mirror 
response based on this literature. With this in view, the following section will 
review the established properties of macaque mirror neurones. 
Area F5 lies within agranular cortex, in a region that lies caudal to the inferior arm 
of the arcuate sulcus (Matelli, 1985). Neurones in this region are Icnown to be 
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involved in the execution of both hand and mouth movements (Gentilucci et al., 
1988; Rizzolatti et al., 1988). Hand-related neurones in this region are activated 
by specific types of goals such as tearing or holding, or by specific types of 
actions such as finger prehension or precision grip (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). A 
subset of these hand-related cells are also activated by the visual presentation of 
a 3D object (Jeannerod et al., 1995). The Italian group that discovered mirror 
neurones were focused on mapping these motor functions in the frontal lobes of 
macaques. Their findings were based on a fortuitous observation. Whilst 
recording from motor neurones in premotor cortex during performance of a 
trained action, the investigators noticed that the same cells that responded during 
action execution were also firing when the macaque remained motionless and 
simply observed an experimenter performing the same action (di Pellegrino et al., 
1992). The investigators subsequently tested the responses of these cells in a 
number of situations. They showed that the cells were true motor neurones, in 
that they responded during action execution even in the absence of visual 
feedback of the action (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese et al., 1996). This eliminated 
the possibility that the cells were responding to purely visual information. Further 
experiments showed that the cells did not respond during observation of a hand 
manipulating an object via a tool; these cells responded only to interaction 
between the biological limb and an object. They interpreted their data as 
evidence for a system that matched action execution and action observation, 
which serves to associate observed actions on objects onto existing motor 
schemata. They represent external events 'mirrored' within circuits for internally 
generated events. Subsequent experiments revealed the presence of mirror 
neurones in different areas of the macaque brain. It was demonstrated that mirror 
neurones exist not only in F5 but also in area PF of the inferior parietal lobe 
(Gallese et al., 1996). More recently, Tkach and colleagues (2007) have 
identified mirror neurones in primary motor cortex of the macaque brain. 
In an attempt to better characterise these cells, Gallese and colleagues (1996) 
recorded from 532 neurones in F5 of two macaque monkeys. This included cells 
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in F5 of both hemispheres. They trained monl(eys to fixate and then reach and 
grasp a variety of objects and food items that evoked three types of action: 
precision grip, finger prehension and whole hand prehension. They also recorded 
from cells in primary motor cortex and made electromyographic (EMG) 
recordings to eliminate the possibility of covert movement. Of the 532 neurones, 
92 were identified as mirror neurones. Thus around 17% of the cells in F5 are 
active during action execution and action observation. 51 of the 92 mirror 
neurones that they identified were specific to one action, so about 50% were 
congruent in their activity. The others, about 30 cells responded during the 
observation of a few actions. The activity of these 91 cells could be divided 
according to the goal of the action involved. These included grasping, holding, 
placing and hand interaction cells. These could be further divided according to 
the type of action used to obtain that goal such as precision grip or finger 
prehension. They also reported mirror activity in both left and right hemispheres 
despite the movements being made only with the right forepaw. 
A number of characteristics were identified: the cells were most strongly 
activated by object-directed movements; intransitive movements such as arm 
lifting or hand waving did not activate the cells, even if the movement had 
emotional meaning; the distance between the observed action and the monlcey 
did not affect the firing activity; and the use of tools to interact with the object or 
miming the action in the absence of an object did not elicit firing from these cells. 
Importantly, it was demonstrated that mirror neurones fire in a consistent manner 
and were not subject to habituation following repeated trials of the same action. 
In most cases these cells were not active in the phase preceding interaction with 
the object, and firing of the cells started only during hand shaping and ended 
when the experimenter's hand left the object. Hand preference was also 
investigated and it was demonstrated that five out of 32 mirror neurones 
demonstrated a preference for actions carried out by the right hand, with a further 
seven having a preference for the left hand. The motor properties of these cells 
were indistinguishable from other motor cells in F5. Lastly the presence was 
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reported of 'mirror-like neurones' in F5, which were active during action 
observation but did not display motor properties. 
Area F5 receives input from AlP and PF of the inferior parietal cortex. It was this 
fact that motivated the search for, and subsequent discovery of, mirror neurones 
in area PF of the inferior parietal lobe (Fogassi et al., 2005). In summary, it 
appears that in premotor areas about 20% of cells have visual properties, 
compared to about 60% in parietal PF areas. However, single cell recordings 
give very limited information about the spatial distribution of classes of neurones. 
Thus, it is not possible to conclude from this small number of studies that there 
are no mirror neurones in other areas of the surrounding cortex. Furthermore, 
mirror neurones are not restricted to the visuomotor domain. A subset of cells in 
premotor cortex have been found which are active during action execution and 
during the perception of motor related auditory stimuli, such as the sound of 
paper tearing (Keysers et al., 2003). Thus, mirror neurones probably encode 
sensory events of different modalities so long as they relate to actions. 
In summary, mirror neurones provide a link between internally generated actions 
and perceived actions with a number of levels of abstraction (they encode both 
the type of hand action and the goal of the action). If I was to identify a similar 
system in the human brain, it was important I use these macaque studies to 
govern appropriate equivalent studies in humans; namely, responses that 
overiap during action execution and action perception, that are not solely due to 
seeing an action, are specific to object-directed action and do not habituate. 
Is there a human 'mirror' system? 
So far I have discussed the evidence that implies that human motor cortices are 
active during observation of movement, but what about human mirror responses? 
In an influential review, Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) stated that the human 
mirror circuit is supported by three brain regions; the parietal lobe, premotor 
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cortex and the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca's area). This statement was supported 
by a number of studies. In the main these studies addressed the blood oxygen-
level dependent (BOLD) response in functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies during the observation, but not execution, of actions. Of all these 
studies, only a handful actually addressed the spatial congruence of activity 
during action execution and observation. Whilst interesting in their own right, 
these studies cannot really be used to provide evidence for, or localisation of, a 
human mirror system. For example, macaque studies report that there are 
'mirror-lilce' neurones in motor cortices, that is neurones which respond to 
observation of a hand but lack motor properties (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese et al., 1996). This emphasises the importance of confirming the 
motor component of mirror neurones. Moreover, as previously discussed, there 
are cells in F5 which respond during action execution and visual presentation of 
an object (canonical neurones). IVIany studies claiming to bok at the human 
mirror system have fallen into this trap (lacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; lacoboni et 
al., 2005). As a result there remains no consensus about whether there is a 
human mirror system and where it is. In brief, in order to infer a human mirror 
response it is necessary to see significant activity during action execution and 
action observation that is not due to the visual presence of an object or a moving 
limb. The following section will summarise those studies on human mirror 
responses that have used more appropriate definitions of a human mirror 
response. 
Grezes and colleagues (2003) carried out fMRI on healthy volunteers, who were 
cued either to observe or execute an action. The observe conditions included 
observing an object, observing an object-directed grasp and observing an object-
less mimicked action. This was the first study to contrast action and observation, 
and to factor in the observation of limb movement as a mimicking condition. They 
reported canonical neurone activity in the precentral sulcus and the intraparietal 
region and mirror neurone activity in premotor cortex, intraparietal cortex and 
superior temporal sulcus. 
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Functional MRI can only give us limited information about neuronal activity. For 
instance, because of the spatial resolution of fiVIRI, we cannot infer from these 
data that the same neurones are active during action execution and observation. 
One way to probe this problem further has been addressed using repetition 
suppression; namely, the reduction in neuronal firing in response to the repeated 
presentation of a certain stimulus (Grili-Spector, 2003, 2006). Three studies have 
exploited this neural phenomenon in order to characterise the human mirror 
response. Dinstein and colleagues (2007) had subjects play 'Paper, Scissors, 
Stone' whilst undergoing event-related fMRl. The design was that subjects were 
executing specific hand movements whilst observing hand movements, and 
sometimes the movements were the same and sometimes they were different. 
The premise was that if mirror neurones existed, there should be a repetition 
suppression effect that transfers across the execution and observation 
conditions. They were then able to identify cortical regions that displayed 
repetition suppression to observing hand movements and for executing the same 
hand movement. This approach highlighted cortical regions specific either for 
observing actions, or executing actions, but not both. However, it is unclear 
whether repetition suppression is relevant to mirror neurone function, given that 
in non-human primates a defining characteristic of mirror neurones is that they do 
not habituate (Gallese et al., 1996). Furthermore, this study did not involve 
object-directed action, which is Icnown to be an important aspect of triggering 
activity of mirror neurones in the macaque. 
Another way of approaching the issue of the human mirror response is the use of 
multi-voxel pattern analysis (IVIVPA). This type of analysis reveals whether the 
pattern of activity across voxels is similar for motor activity elicited by action 
execution and action observation. Although this does not allow a resolution below 
that of an individual voxel (typically 3mm^), similar spatial patterns of activity 
implicate the same populations of cells in action execution and observation. This 
method was used by Dinstein and colleagues, (2008). They reported an absence 
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of correlated spatial patterns, indicating that different subpopulations of cells 
were encoding action perception and action execution in the anterior intraparietal 
sulcus. A subsequent study reported a positive result in premotor cortex during 
action execution and listening to an action (Etzel et a!., 2008). This discrepancy 
is likely to be due to differences in the nature of the action; Etzel and colleagues 
(2008) used object-directed action and Dinstein and colleagues (2008b) did not. 
Thus, the disparity in the results of these two publications is likely to be due to 
the difference in the nature of the action, that is one either directed towards an 
object or not. This is an important difference, one I attempt to address in Chapter 
3. 
There are single cell studies in the human, performed during surgery for 
intractable epilepsy, that have demonstrated individual neurones in anterior 
cingulate cortex which responded both when the subjects received painful stimuli 
and when they observed the effects of painful stimuli on actors (Hutchison et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, and as originally defined, a mirror neurone is a single cell 
which responds during execution of an action, and not just to an action perceived 
through different sensory modalities. Due to experimental constraints, the 
presence of such a cell type has never been demonstrated in the human brain. 
Using fMRI, the best that can be achieved is defining spatial patterns of activity 
that indicate the existence of human mirror areas. Overall, and within this spatial 
constraint, there is reasonable evidence for a mirror response in the human 
motor system. Nonetheless, it is clear that the majority of neurones in premotor 
and parietal regions have functions other than mirroring actions. There are purely 
visual neurones and purely motor neurones and this must be taken into account 
when designing and interpreting studies in this field. The following paragraphs 
will outline a number of properties that have been investigated in relation to the 
putative human mirror system. 
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Lateralisation 
Mirror neurones have been found in F5 of both hemispheres of the macaque 
monl<ey (Galiese et al., 1996). In the human, the mirror system also seems to be 
represented bilaterally. However, not surprisingly given the prevalence of right-
handedness, most studies have required subjects to execute actions with the 
right hand or observe actions made with the right hand. Therefore, it cannot be 
concluded that the system is truly bilateral. A recent study has addressed this 
issue by presenting right-handed actions to the right visual field and vice versa. 
This study confirmed that the human mirror response is bilateral after controlling 
for the limb used for execution, that used for observed action and for the visual 
field to which the action was presented (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). This effect was 
greater for the hemisphere ipsilateral to the stimulus and response hand. Further 
convincing evidence for this finding comes from a study that used repetitive 
(inhibitory) TMS; transient deficits in imitation were seen following interruption of 
activity in either left or right inferior frontal gyrus (Heiser et al., 2003). Functional 
imaging studies have shown that premotor areas involved in imitation are not left 
lateralised (Kosl(i et al., 2002). A TiVIS study also showed that IVIEP facilitation 
was no greater in either hemisphere irrespective of the hand being observed 
(Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002). Overall these data imply that the human mirror 
response is a bilateral phenomenon. 
Anatomical and mirror imitation 
When asked to imitate an action executed by someone facing the observer, 
some people tend to imitate in an anatomically accurate manner (i.e. imitate a 
left-handed movement with a left hand). This is referred to as anatomical 
imitation. Other people, however, tend to imitate in an anatomically incorrect 
manner, Icnown as mirror or specular imitation. A handful of studies have looked 
at how the human mirror system responds to these different forms of imitation. 
Koski and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that specular imitation is associated 
with increased BOLD activity in bilateral IFG and right posterior parietal cortex 
compared to anatomical imitation. They interpret this finding as evidence that the 
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mirror system is more engaged during specular imitation. Subsequent studies 
have replicated this finding (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007). Evidence indicates 
that regions Icnown to display mirror responses differentiate between the two 
forms of imitation, and seems to indicate that anatomical imitation may be at 
least partially independent of the mirror system (Franz et al., 2007). 
Transitive and intransitive action 
iVIirror neurones in the macaque brain are thought to respond only to transitive 
actions, that is those that are directed at objects. The current opinion is that the 
human mirror system responds to both transitive and non-object-directed 
(intransitive) actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). This is based on a number 
of studies. EEC studies have reported no significant difference between EEG 
recordings during executing and observing finger movements (Calmels et al., 
2006; Tremblay et al., 2004). Furthermore, observation of certain movements 
can influence simultaneous movement execution ('motor interference effect') 
which is the case for both transitive and intransitive movements (for example, 
see (Brass et al., 2000; Kilner et al., 2003). These studies, however, were not 
designed to look at the question of human mirror neurones, but investigated 
responses to observed actions alone. More stringently designed experiments 
have not arrived at the same conclusions. Jonas and colleagues (2007) reported 
that observation and imitation of finger movements were not associated with 
significantly greater BOLD activity in the mirror networlcs than observing or 
tracking moving dots, iacoboni and colleagues (1999) also showed that activity in 
the left inferior frontal and right anterior parietal areas were present in low-level 
observation control conditions. This highlights the importance of including 
appropriate control conditions, and suggests that the debate about the response 
of the mirror system to intransitive actions has not been resolved. 
The role of reward in the mirror system 
The original macaque studies were only possible because the experimenters 
trained the animals to perform specific actions. The rewards for these tasks were 
usually fruit or fruit juice. It has been acknowledged that the animals find it harder 
29 
to pay attention to objects compared to food in these experiments (Gallese et. a!., 
1996). In humans the reward element is not necessary as subjects can be relied 
on to obey instructions when asked to execute or observe an action. However, 
reward almost certainly influences the response of the mirror system. For 
example, Cheng and colleagues have demonstrated that hungry subjects 
watching actors grasping food exhibit increased activity in IPG compared to fed 
subjects (Cheng, IVIeltzoff et al., 2007). Whilst this study doesn't tell us much 
about mirror neurones per se, it does tell us that the motor system may be 
engaged more during salient events. 
Mirror responses in superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
The literature indicates that the macaque's STS contains neurones that respond 
during observation of movement. This refers to sight of one's own movement and 
that of movement by a conspecific. It is currently thought that the STS contributes 
to the mirror neurone networl( but does not contain mirror neurones, as cells in 
the STS are not active during action execution. In the human brain, however, a 
number of studies have reported STS activity during action execution (Grezes et 
al., 2003). It is suggested by Keysers and Perrett (2004), this activity reflects 
GABAergic inhibitory neurones in the STS that serve to suppress the response to 
self-generated movement, a form of sensory gating. 
Inferior frontal gyrus; mirror neurones in Broca's area? 
Broca's area comprises the pars operculars and triangularis of the inferior frontal 
gyrus (BA44 and 45). First described in 19th century, it is known to be central to 
speech production. Lesions to this area often result in deficits in speech output 
whilst speech comprehension remains relatively intact, a condition known as 
Broca's aphasia. Language is thought to be a uniquely human trait, but there has 
been much interest in identifying whether there is a precursor of Broca's area in 
the macaque brain. 
A number of authors have attempted to address this problem using comparative 
anatomy. Petrides and colleagues (2005) employed a combination of 
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architectonic and electrophysiological analysis of macaque neurones in this 
premotor area. Their data indicate the presence of a cortical region, anterior to 
ventral agranular BAG, which resembles human Broca's area. In the macaque 
this region is involved in control of orofacial movement. Others have argued that 
area F5, the ventral premotor cortex in BAB, is the precursor or macaque 
equivalent of human Broca's area. The hypothetical presence of mirror neurones 
in the macaque homologue of Brocas's area has led to a number of theories 
suggesting that mirror neurones underlie the acquisition of language, in terms 
both of ontogeny and phylogeny (Fogassi, 2004; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). In 
Rizzolatti's review (2004), Broca's area is included as part of the mirror neurone 
network in the human brain based on a number of localisation studies (lacoboni 
etal., 2005; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, IVIatelli et al., 1996). However there are a number 
of discrepancies in the research implicating IFG, including Broca's area, in the 
human mirror network. 
There is some evidence to support the idea that Broca's area is more involved in 
action imitation and observation than spontaneous action (Grezes et al., 2003; 
lacoboni et al., 1999). This then negates one definition of a mirror neurone, that it 
is active during execution even in the absence of visual feedback. Closer 
examination of all the studies that report 'mirror neurone activity' in this region 
reveals that many of them failed to carry out the comparison of executed and 
observed action, for example (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Matelli et al., 1996), but just 
examined observed action (lacoboni et al., 2005) or only reported Broca's area 
activation in response to imitative (Grezes et al., 2003; Williams et al., 2006) or 
imagined tasks (Grafton et al., 1996). Some authors report that mirror responses 
in Broca's area are greater in imitation conditions (Nishitani and Han, 2002). This 
assertion is further supported by a functional dissociation between imitation and 
action execution in Broca's area. Repetitive TIVIS (rTIVIS) applied to bilateral pars 
opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus was shown to impair performance on 
imitation but not spontaneous execution of finger movements (Heiser et al., 
2003). A number of other studies have highlighted the role of Broca's area in 
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imitation (Heiser et al., 2003; lacoboni et al., 1999; Koslci et al., 2003; Koski et al., 
2002) and/or preparation for imitation (Krams et al., 1998). 
An alternative theory has been put forward by IVIorin and Grezes (2008) based on 
the functional properties of inferior frontal gyrus. They conducted a meta-analysis 
of 24 studies looking at action observation in premotor cortex. They showed that 
when a target or goal was present in the observed action (a requirement for a 
mirror response), activity was associated with ventral premotor cortex (BA6). 
Activity in BA44 of the inferior frontal gyrus (comprising part of Broca's area) was 
not modulated by the presence of a target and they found no evidence of visual 
processing in BA45. On the basis of this data they proposed that ventral BAG is 
more likely the human homologue of macaque F5. In brief then, the issue of 
monkey-human homology within the IPG is still subject to debate, and theories 
that assert the mirror system as the substrate for language acquisition are not yet 
supported by empirical evidence. 
Selectivity of the mirror system to biological motion 
Macaque mirror neurones are active when observing a human grasp an object, 
but not when the object is manipulated using a tool (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; 
Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese et al., 1996). Thus, in order to 
identify human mirror responses we should abide by this definition. However a 
more recent study describes mirror neurones that do respond to object 
manipulation using a tool rather than a biological limb; the cells respond to both 
observation of a grasp and manipulation by tool if the goal is common to both 
actions (Ferrari et al., 2005). The authors concluded that after substantial 
exposure to tool use, macaques can develop an association between the limb 
and the tool, such that the tool is perceived as a biological extension of the hand. 
If the human mirror system serves to match observed and executed actions in 
order to support action recognition and other higher cognitive motor processes, 
one may predict that it should be selective for biological motion. One way of 
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investigating the sensitivity of the mirror system to biological motion is to use 
point-light biological-motion (PLBM). PLBM uses sparse sampling of biological 
motion; when static these images bok like random clusters of dots on the black 
background. When they move, the percept of a moving human becomes clear. 
These animations thus contain relatively little information, but what information 
there is seems animate in origin. It is possible to extract a surprising amount of 
information from PLBM animations, including the sex, affect, style and 
sometimes even the identity of the actor (Troje, 2002). It is known that PLBM 
compared to scrambled point-light motion is associated with increased BOLD 
activity in frontal cortices, including precentral gyri and IPG (Saygin et al., 2004). 
The same findings are reported from EEG studies employing mu wave 
suppression as an indirect measure of mirror responses (Ulloa and Pineda, 
2007). All of these studies, like many others, did not involve an action execution 
condition, and therefore only provide a limited perspective on the mirror system. 
However, together these studies indicate that sensorimotor encoding of observed 
actions are tuned to biological motion. 
If the mirror system matches observed movements on to existing motor 
schemata, it should not respond to movements for which the subject does not 
have a motor representation. Buccino and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that 
the observation of biting movements is associated with activity in the human 
mirror network, regardless of which species was observed to be doing the biting 
(human, monkey, dog). In contrast, humans observing a dog's facial and jaw 
movements when barking did not result in activity in the frontal part of the mirror 
network. This implies that movements encoded in the observer's motor repertoire 
are encoded differently to movements that are not, especially in the IPG. A recent 
study looked at manual reaction time to identify whether drawings of hands 
represented the left or right hand. The authors included hands from four species 
of ape; orang-utan, gorilla, chimpanzee and human (Gawryszewski et al., 2007). 
They found no effect of species on reaction time. This is interesting as the task, 
identification of the hand as left or right, required motor simulation of the images, 
a process in which the mirror system has been implicated. 
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Further, an fMRI study investigating biologically-possible and -impossible finger 
movements reported no difference in premotor regions but increased activity in 
parietal regions for impossible movements (Costantini et ai., 2005). More 
recently, however, it has been shown that if subjects are explicitly informed of the 
difference between possible and impossible actions for imitation the response is 
modified (Longo et al., 2008). Tai and colleagues (2004) showed that when 
observing grasping actions, there was significant BOLD activity in left premotor 
cortex, but not when the grasping actions were performed by a robotic 'hand'. A 
more recent study, however, has shown the exact opposite (Gazzola et al., 
2007). The authors discuss this discrepancy in terms of efficiency of 
experimental design. They argued that observing robotic hands did not result in 
measurable activity in frontal areas using the blocl<ed design necessary for an 
activation study with positron emission tomography (PET), but the response was 
evident when using an event-related fMRI study. 
Overall, it appears that PLBM, lacking in visual detail but containing basic visual 
biological parameters, triggers activity in motor cortices. Given that we l<now 
observation of action has this affect, perhaps this is not surprising. While there 
may be subtle differences, it seems that the mirror system does not discriminate 
clearly between actions for which the observer has no associated motor 
representation, such as the movements of other animals or biologically 
impossible movements. 
Multimodal encoding in the mirror system 
The traditional concept of a mirror neurone is a visuomotor cell that responds 
during action execution and action observation. As previously discussed, a 
subset of cells in premotor cortex has been found which are audiomotor mirror 
neurones (Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002); that is, they respond during 
action execution and during the perception of action-related sounds (the majority 
also respond to observation of action). In humans, a functional imaging study has 
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demonstrated that sounds associated with actions activate a frontoparietal 
network more than sounds with no associated motor schemata (Lahav et al., 
2007). In this study musicians were asked to listen to three types of music: music 
that they were able to play (motorically familiar), the same music in a jumbled 
order or familiar music that was motorically unfamiliar. They showed that only the 
former two conditions were associated with bilateral frontoparietal activity 
including the IPG, premotor cortex and inferior parietal cortex. These findings 
demonstrate the presence of associations between motor-related sensory 
percepts and motor schemata, and highlight the role of motor experience in these 
associations. 
Sex of the subject 
A few papers have suggested that there are gender differences in the human 
mirror response. For example, Cheng and colleagues had healthy subjects watch 
videos of actors walking. Their data showed a greater response in terms of mu 
wave suppression and in spinal cord excitability in women compared to men 
(Cheng, Decety et al., 2007). However, it seems implausible that a mirror system 
would show any major differences between men and women. 
Possible functions of the human mirror system 
So far I have discussed the evidence that indicates human motor systems in 
general are active during action observation, and I have covered the literature 
about macaque mirror neurones and the attempts to identify a human mirror 
system. In the following section I will outline the roles that have been proposed 
for a human mirror system, and the evidence that supports these theories. 
Control of visually-guided action 
At the most basic level, it may be argued that the visual function of these motor 
neurones plays a role in the control of visually-guided action. However, they are 
active in the absence of visual feedback (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese et al., 1996). 
Interestingly, whilst by definition mirror neurones are motor neurones, they are 
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not directly responsible for action execution. Administration of muscimol, a 
neuronal inhibitor, to the region of F5 containing mirror neurones does not affect 
execution or control of grasping actions apart from a slowing of the action 
(Fogassi et al., 2001). Visuomotor neurones in a neighbouring region of F5 are, 
however, central to action generation; the same treatment applied to canonical 
neurones impaired the ability to control hand shape for the object. 
Action recognition and understanding 
Canonical neurones are a subset of cells in premotor cortex that respond during 
action execution and the observation of the static object used in the action. It is 
thought that these cells provide an association between an object and the 
appropriate action, thus supporting action selection. Interestingly, patients with 
ideational apraxia, who are unable to associate actions with objects, are known 
to have lesions that often include inferior frontal cortex (Kertesz and Ferro, 1984). 
Furthermore, more recent studies have demonstrated that a subset of these 
patients suffer from impaired recognition of gesture, suggesting that the 
mechanisms involved in action performance are causally involved in action 
perception and understanding (Pazzaglia et al., 2008). The ability of these 
patients to understand observed actions has yet to be fully characterised, but 
would provide a crucial link between action execution and action understanding. 
Two patients suffering from a complete loss of proprioception due to haptic 
deafferentation have also been shown to have a deficit in perceiving observed 
movements (Bosbach et al., 2005). In this experiment the patients were asked to 
estimate the weight of boxes of two different sizes simply from observing them, 
which they were capable of doing. They were then asked to observe actors lifting 
these boxes of different sizes, and had to assess whether the actors were told 
the correct weight of the box before lifting. This rather complex paradigm tested 
their ability to make a correct judgement about the internal states of the actors 
purely by analysing the kinetics of the observed movement. This intriguing case 
study showed that, in the absence of normal somatosensory feedback, one's 
ability to perceive the observed world, and furthermore infer the internal states of 
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others, is affected. A functional imaging study has shown that cortical region 
involved in predicting observed movement is similar to those involved in action 
recognition, and indeed the mirror system (Lamm et al., 2007). 
Theory of mind and empathy 
Theory of mind (Premack, 1978) refers to the knowledge that others have mental 
states such as goals, beliefs, intentions or desires, that may differ from one's own 
and to have the ability to infer what these mental states are from observing 
behaviour. There are two prevailing theories of how humans are able to perform 
this type of inference (also referred to as mind reading). Theory theory' dictates 
that individuals create rules as they learn, and use these to infer the internal 
states of others. In other words, observed states are interpreted by means of a 
set of laws, or rules that 'connect the explanatory conditions with the behaviour 
explained' (Churchland, 1990, p 207). For example, when a person experiences 
damage to the body, they will feel pain. When someone experiences pain they 
wince. Thus, when observing someone wince the observer can deduce from 
these rules that the subject is experiencing a painful stimulus. An important 
aspect of this theory is that any creature with this knowledge can make these 
deductions, human or non-human. It is conceivable that an artificially intelligent 
being could use these laws to interpret the observed world. 
'Simulation theory', on the other hand, asserts that the observed or imagined 
mental states of others are mapped onto one's existing representations and are 
interpreted on this basis. Evidence for this theory comes from a number of 
avenues. Shepard and Metzler (Shepard and Metzler, 1971) demonstrated that 
mental rotation of an object takes roughly the same time as rotating it in reality. In 
the past simulation theory has suffered from what is known as the 
correspondence problem; how do you transform an observed action into an 
executed one? In the same year mirror neurones were discovered, Gallese et al. 
(1996) proposed that mirror neurones may subserve recognition of observed 
actions. Two years later Gallese and Goldman (1998) extended this argument to 
37 
suggest the human mirror system provided support for 'simulation theory', and it 
has been suggested that the discovery of mirror neurones may have provided a 
solution to the correspondence problem (Brass and Heyes, 2005). Any mirror 
system involved in theory of mind (ToM) is likely to rely on simulation of face 
movements, rather than hand actions, and studies have shown that both 
macaque mirror neurones (Ferrari et al., 2003) and a human mirror system exists 
for mouth actions (Buccino et al., 2001; Etzel et al., 2008). 
The ability to engage TolVI is thought to be deficient or absent in a number of 
prominent neuropsychiatric disorders, thus generating a prediction. If the mirror 
system supports ToM, and certain patient groups have impaired ToM, one would 
expect to see a differential mirror response. If this were found to be the case, it 
would provide compelling evidence to suggest that ToM does rely on the mirror 
system. There is preliminary evidence from two patients groups, those with 
autism and schizophrenia, that has been used to suggest this may be the case. 
Autism is a developmental disorder characterised by impairments in verbal and 
non-verbal communication. It is often accompanied by deficits in ToM processing 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), and a number of studies have 
indicated abnormal visual processing in the motor circuitry in patients with autism 
(Hadjikhani et al., 2007; Oberman et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2006; Williams et 
al., 2001). A subset of patients with schizophrenia are also known to suffer from 
ToM deficits (see (Frith, 2004), and hence it would be of interest to compare the 
mirror system in this group compared to healthy individuals. A number of authors 
have highlighted the possibility of dysfunction within the human mirror system in 
these patients (Agnew et al., 2007; lacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Salvatore et al., 
2007). Recently a handful of studies have begun to reveal an empirical link 
between abnormal motor systems and schizophrenia. For example, it has been 
shown that patients with schizophrenia who scored below average on tests of 
social cognition have reduced grey matter in regions that may be considered to 
be part of the extended mirror system (Bertrand et al., 2008). However it is 
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important to note that both Autism and Schizophrenia are heterogeneous 
disorders which encompass a wide range of symptoms and behavioural 
disturbances. Furthermore both conditions are known to be associated with long 
term cognitive deficits. It is not yet clear how deficits to a human mirror system 
might manifest in this range of symptoms or how it may interact with a more 
general deficit in cognition. 
Simulation theory has been extended to empathy processing. Warren and 
colleagues (2006) have demonstrated that listening to emotional sounds is 
associated with premotor activity. In contrast, other studies have implicated the 
insula as the site of common encoding for facial expressions and emotion (Carr 
et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003). Furthermore a recent TMS study has shown 
that the size of MEPs during observation of painful stimuli correlated inversely 
with measures of psychopathy (Fecteau et al., 2004). This is interpreted as a lack 
of 'motor empathy' in these patients. 
Imitation and motor learning 
Since it is thought that mirror neurones map observed actions on to executed 
actions, it has been suggested by many that perhaps they are involved in 
imitation, the execution of an observed action. Both functional localisation and 
TMS studies indicate that activity in known 'mirror regions', namely the IFG, are 
involved in imitation (Fadiga et al., 2005; Fadiga et al., 1995; lacoboni et al., 
1999). However, imitation is different to spontaneous action execution, and there 
are problems associated with investigating the role of the mirror system in 
imitation. 
According to a prevailing model of praxis (Lichtheim, 1885; Rothi et al., 1991), 
there are two routes to action. The first gains access to action semantics, leading 
to a representation of an associated action and then spontaneous action 
execution. This would occur for example on verbal command, or on perception of 
an object. By definition, this route for action only applies to familiar actions and 
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the memories associated with them (see Seidler et al., 2004). Alternatively, one 
can observe an action and carry out a visuomotor transformation of that action: in 
other words imitate. This route is heavily dependent on sensory feedback (online 
monitoring) during execution of the action. If asked to imitate an action which is 
recognisable, such as using a pair of scissors, it is likely that a subject would rely 
on action recognition in order to imitate, using the semantic lexical route to 
action, rather than the visuomotor route. This is supported by the fact that if 
asked to copy an action, many subjects use a complementary rather then 
imitative technique, i.e. they might imitate a right hand movement with their left 
hand rather than their right. On this basis, I argue that imitation can only be truly 
tested by asking subjects to imitate entirely unfamiliar, meaningless and complex 
actions. This would prevent them from relying on action semantics to execute the 
action and would ensure that they are reliant on visuomotor transformation. 
Imitated actions always rely on short-term motor memory, although in an 
experiment the lag between observation and action should be reduced to as 
short a period as possible to investigate 'pure' visuomotor transformation rather 
than working memory. Conversely, the macaque studies have indicated that 
intransitive (non-object directed, but not necessarily meaningless) movements do 
not elicit mirror neurone activity. Thus, the problem in investigating the role of the 
mirror system lies in imitation necessarily involving execution of a movement 
whilst observing that movement. However, to define a mirror response, activity 
must be seen during action in the absence of visual feedback. 
Despite this issue, patients with ideomotor apraxia have provided some insight 
into this issue. A subset of these patients suffer from a deficit to the visuomotor 
aspect of action execution (Pazzaglia et al., 2008). In other words, their action 
semantics are intact, they can verbally indicate and spontaneously perform the 
correct action on presentation of an object, but they have a selective deficit in 
imitation of action. Thus it would be possible to carry out fMRI studies on this 
patient group in order to identify if they have 'normal' mirror responses. 
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The computational mechanisms behind such a suggestion remains unclear 
(Oztop et al., 2006). The primary issues are: a) mapping sensory information 
onto motor representations; b) compensation for physical aspects that differ 
between the imitator and the observed actor (such as body position); and c) 
encoding the intention or goal of the observed action (Wolpert et al., 2003). So 
how might this mechanism work? Planning and control of action execution is 
thought to rely on internal models of action. Internal models comprise forward 
models (the sensory consequences of an action are predicted, as the result of 
the generation of a motor efference copy, and compared to the actual 
consequences for online monitoring and correction of an action), and inverse 
models (the transformation from a sensory representation to a motor 
representation that fulfils those sensory criteria). Some models suggest that 
mirror neurones are involved in the formation of the inverse model (Arbib and 
Rizzolati 1997), whereas others have suggested that they are involved in both 
the fonward and the inverse models (see IVIiall, 2003). One operational definition 
of the functional anatomy postulates that there are reciprocal connections 
between STS, PF and F5. The STS responds to the observation of biological 
actions, self or other (Carr et al., 2003; lacoboni et al., 1999), but not during 
action execution. It is suggested that the STS serves to identify the best match 
between an observed action and a motor representation allowing subsequent 
imitation of that action. This is supported by studies that show perspective 
invariant encoding of observed actions in STS (see Keysers and Perrett, 2004). 
Given that these pathways are reciprocal, the idea is that information can be 
transformed in both directions, from visual to motor and vice versa. Others have 
suggested, with good evidence, that this comparison takes place in the 
cerebellum (Miall, 2003) or that both the cerebellum and cerebral cortex are 
involved (Arbib et al., 1998). 
However, there are a number of problems with this model. One is that mirror 
neurones are found in the macaque and it is argued that these animals are not 
able to imitate. If mirror neurones do support imitation, the possibilities are that 
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either the human mirror neurone system has evolved beyond that of the 
macaque, or non-human primates can imitate, at least at a rudimentary level. 
Further, while the model might account for imitation of actions that have existing 
motor representations, it does not explain the imitation of novel unfamiliar 
actions. 
Language acquisition 
A number of authors have detailed theories of language acquisition that are 
based primarily on two premises. First, that mirror neurones may provide a link 
between observed (or heard) actions and their associated motor representation. 
Second, mirror neurones are found in F5, thought by some to be the homologue 
of human Broca's area. As I have discussed, both of these premises have yet to 
be firmly established, and the suggestion that mirror neurones are involved in 
language acquisition is premature. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest 
some role for motor cortices in language processing. 
Cells in non-human primate brain have been found that respond during the 
execution and observation of orofacial movements (Ferrari et al., 2003). These 
authors report that mouth-related mirror neurones constitute about a third of 
mouth motor neurones in ventral PIVIC. Most are related to eating, but some are 
more responsive to communicative mouth actions. Functional MRI studies have 
shown that listening to individual action works (verbs) is associated with 
increased BOLD activity in premotor cortices. Moreover, the nature of the verb 
appears to be influential in determining the exact location of the activity within 
premotor cortex. Pulvermuller and colleagues (2008; Hauk et al., 2008) have 
mapped out responses to verb processing that roughly follow the somatotopy of 
premotor cortex. They demonstrated that when hearing the word kick', the leg 
representation within premotor cortex is significantly more active than in a control 
condition, and the same somatotopy was evident for verbs related to arm and 
tongue movements. Furthermore, TMS studies have demonstrated that 
corticospinal excitability is facilitated during the perception of language. Rizzolatti 
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and colleagues (2005) have shown that action related sentences such as the 
boy grasped the handle' facilitated MEPs from the hand area more than abstract 
sentences such as 'the boy liked the handle'. However, other studies indicate 
that motor activity during speech perception may be related to motor simulation 
rather than comprehension (Fadiga et al., 2002). Together these data have been 
interpreted as evidence that motor simulation is involved in language perception 
but it is unclear what role this plays in comprehension. 
There are a number of problems with the theory about mirror neurones and 
language. First, whilst language production is one of the most complex of 
actions, it is an intransitive action. Whilst mouth-related mirror neurones have 
been documented (Ferrari et al., 2003), these authors report that communicative 
mouth mirror neurones constitute a very small proportion of mouth motor 
neurones. How this small subset of cells can be responsible for the acquisition of 
an entire repertoire of complex meaningful mouth actions has yet to be 
established. They concede that observation of communicative mouth movements 
(lip protrusion and lip smacldng) only rarely elicited a mirror response, and they 
put this down to the fact that the observed action was carried out by a human 
and not a macaque monkey. 
The role of the mirror system in agency; discrimination between self 
and non-self 
Another issue to be addressed is how we are able to maintain a sense of agency 
despite widespread common encoding of action execution and observation. The 
term 'agency' refers to the ability to correctly distinguish between internally and 
externally generated events. So the question is this: if the same cells are active 
during action execution and action observation, how do we maintain a sense of 
which is which? Furthermore, does the human mirror system have a role to play 
in discriminating between the two events? 
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Both observation of movement and imagining movement have been shown to 
increase corticospinal excitability (Fadiga et al., 1995; Izumi et al., 1995), 
indicating that the motor cortices are active during certain non-motor events. The 
question then arises as to how imagined, observed and executed movements are 
not confused. One possibility is this increased corticospinal excitability is due to 
mirror neurone activity; mirror neurones are active in motor cortices during 
observed movement but are not essential for movement execution (Fogassi et 
al., 2001). Perhaps these cells, or a subset of these cells, encode or are involved 
in encoding information about the agent. 
The prevailing theory of agency processing suggests that during initiation of a 
motor event a corollary discharge or efference copy (Sperry, 1950; von Hoist, 
1950) is generated (Frith, 1995). This refers to a signal that encodes the 
predicted sensory consequences of that event. An example of how this system 
may be useful can be seen in the seemingly smooth perception of the visual 
world, despite the rapid and darting movements of the eyeball. It is suggested 
that the elusive efference copy, generated at the point of the motor command, 
contains the information needed to compensate for saccadic eye movements. 
Brain regions that are known to be involved in agency processing or as the origin 
of the efference copy include the superior parietal lobe (Ruby and Decety, 2004). 
Others have suggested that a dysfunctional mirror neurone system, in 
combination with other neural systems may be involved in deficits to agency 
processing, such as felt presence (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007) and Capgras 
syndrome (Ohigashi, 2006). Uddin and colleagues (2007) have proposed that 
frontoparietal mirror systems provide a link between the physical self and others, 
and that cortical midline structures such as the anterior cingulate are more 
involved in self-related processing. How these two networks may interact has yet 
to be investigated. The second aim of this study was thus to investigate any 
interaction between the mirror system and the system generating efference 
copies. This experiment is described in Chapter 5. 
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Computational constraints of a mirror response 
In suggesting that this human mirror system may be responsible for Imitation, 
action understanding, and possibly the evolution of language, we are in the 
absence of a plausible neuronal mechanism for such roles (Oztop et al., 2006). It 
remains unclear just what information is encoded in the mirror neurone response 
and how this differs between responses to execution and observation of action. 
How does the 'resonance' of one's own motor cortex support imitation at a 
cortical level? How might the semantic meaning of an action be incorporated into 
this model? 
A number of computational models have tried to address this neglected aspect of 
mirror neurone research (for a comprehensive and critical review see (Oztop et 
al., 2006). All are based on classical Hebbian synaptic plasticity, which is thought 
to result in associations between the simultaneous occurrence of neural and 
environmental events. These associations can be retrieved when there is activity 
in any part of an established Hebbian network. Mirror neurons may constitute 
part of a visuomotor network, and either the motor command or sensory 
stimulation will trigger activity throughout the network. If this were the case, that 
observing an action activates the motor regions involved in executing an action, it 
would be necessary to have a system for preventing observed actions becoming 
executed actions (echopraxia), and for discriminating between observed and 
executed actions. 
There is an issue of congruence that remains a problem in theories of human 
mirror neurone function. That is, in the macaque brain, mirror neurones vary in 
terms of their congruence; some respond during action execution and only 
observation of that same action (highly congruent) and others respond to the 
observation of a range of similar actions (broadly congruent). This creates a 
paradox, as these cells are thought to match executed and observed actions, but 
unless all mirror neurones are highly congruent, mismatches will occur. On this 
basis, and what is known about the percentage of cells in premotor areas that 
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display mirror properties, it is not feasible to imagine that for every cell 
responsible for execution of a specific action, there is a parallel mirror neurone 
that matches that action to an observed action. A more likely scenario is one 
where a high proportion of motor neurones in premotor areas are responsible for 
a highly specific motor execution system, but only a small number of cells that 
also respond to observation of action are able to roughly categorise these 
actions. In other words, the response of the motor cortex to visual feedforward 
information is of a much lower resolution than the motor outflow. In humans this 
remains to be investigated. Perhaps the extent of the BOLD response in the 
motor cortices during action observation will be much greater than expected for 
20% and 60% of neurones in premotor and parietal cortex, respectively. Such a 
situation may explain why human mirror neurones may be involved in higher 
functions that are not present in non-human macaques. 
To conclude this chapter, I have covered the literature involved in action 
execution and highlighted the evidence indicating common encoding of action 
execution and perception. I have outlined what is known, or not known, about 
mirror neurones, and the human mirror system. What is clear is that relatively 
little is known about these cells, and yet there is a wealth of studies that have 
tried to link basic motor neurone function to high level cognitive capacities such 
as empathy, psychopathy and language comprehension, and to complex 
disorders such as autism and schizophrenia. This is a large intellectual leap that 
is greatly lacking in empirical support. Thus, the experiments described in this 
thesis aim to make some headway in addressing this issue. None of these 
experiments involve behavioural or cognitive measures. Instead they focus on 
the more basic motor properties of the putative human mirror system. 
The use offMRI to investigate mirror neurones 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fIVIRI) will not be able to identify the 
presence of absence of individual human mirror neurones for two reasons: 
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Primarily, the spatial resolution of fIVIRI only allows the identification of voxels of 
activity. These voxels are 2 to 3 mm^ in size and reflect the sum activity of 
thousands of neurones. Thus it is not possible to know whether significant activity 
identifies using fMRI reflects the activity of single neurones active during action 
observation and execution, or whether there are visual and motor neighbouring 
neurones underlying activity common to executing and observing an action. 
Secondly, fIVIRI provides an indirect measure of neuronal activity; this method 
identifies increased vascular responses, that are assumed to reflect increased 
neuronal responses associated with a certain experimental condition. These 
issues are discussed further in the methods section of this thesis. Ultimately only 
recordings from single cells of human brain will identify the existence of human 
mirror neurones as fMRI does not have the spatial resolution to identify human 
mirror neurones. However, careful experimental design allows us to identify 
regions of the brain that display profiles of activity that match that of mirror 
neurones. 
The spatial reolution headway in addressing this issue. None of these 
experiments involve behavioural or cognitive 
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Aims and objectives of this thesis 
The literature I have discussed provides solid evidence that premotor, parietal 
and perhaps inferior frontal cortices are active during action perception and 
execution. Despite this extensive research there is a considerable amount that is 
not l<nown about the human mirror system. The aims of this thesis were 
threefold: 
• To identify the closest possible human mirror response: In my first 
experiment (Chapter 3) I designed an experiment using fMRI, based 
closely on macaque single-cell recordings, that would highlight areas of 
the human brain displaying 'mirror responses'. I also wanted to look at 
how the presence of an object influences the mirror response compared to 
non-object directed action, in order to better characterise the system, as 
this is currently under much debate. 
• To investigate thie role of object familiarity and affordance on the 
mirror response; Does the mirror system have a functional role in the 
brain and if so what may this role be? In Chapter 4 I describe an 
experiment I designed to look at whether the mirror system may be a 
consequence of incidental Hebbian coupling of action perception and 
action execution networks. 
• To investigate the role of the mirror system in agency processing: 1 
then wanted to address the question of how a sense of agency is 
maintained during execution and observation of actions despite 
widespread common encoding. 
Hypotheses 
• I proposed that a network of motor areas would support the mirror 
response to real objects. On the basis of previous studies I suggested this 
would include parietal association cortex, premotor cortices and potentially 
inferior frontal cortex. 
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On the basis of my hypotheses, I predicted that the mirror system would 
respond differently, depending on the degree of familiarity of limb/object 
interaction. 
Lastly, I proposed that I would be able to dissociate brain regions with 
mirror properties from those involved in the efference copy and agency 
discrimination. 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
The history of magnetic resonance imaging 
MRI relies on the principles of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging. The 
property of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) was discovered independently by 
Felix Bloch and Edward Purcell, both of whom later received the Nobel Prize for 
their work in 1952. They described how nuclei placed in a magnetic field absorb 
energy and, when removed from that field, emit that energy at the radiofrequency 
of the electromagnetic spectrum. By the early 1970s Raymond Damadian, a 
clinician from New York had demonstrated that T1 relaxation times differed for 
tumours and healthy tissue in vitro. A few years later, Richard Ernst developed 
the idea of phase and frequency encoding which formed the basis of current iVIRI 
techniques. In 1977 Peter IVIansfield developed echoplanar imaging, which 
formed the basis of functional MRI (Multi-planar image formation using NMR 
spin-echos, 1977) and for which he was later awarded the Nobel Prize in 2003. 
Ten years later this technique was used to images a single cardiac cycle in real 
time (Chapman et al., 1987). Functional MRI was developed in 1992 providing 
the basis for functional brain mapping. 
Principles of NMR 
NMR signals rely on the fact that certain nuclei, including hydrogen, have a 
fundamental property referred to as spin. Any moving electric charge produces a 
magnetic field. Spin causes a particle to act as if it were a magnet with north and 
south poles. The majority of human tissue is comprised of fat and water, both of 
which have abundant hydrogen. Spin exists in multiples of % and can be positive 
or negative. For example, hydrogen has a single unpaired proton and therefore 
has a net spin of %. Normally the direction of these spins is random. When a 
hydrogen atom (or any other proton with a non-zero spin), is placed in a 
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magnetic field (B0), the particle aligns itself with or against the magnetic field. 
When the particle is aligned in a NorthSouth-NorthSouth configuration this is 
known as a low energy configuration, and the opposite, NorthNorth-SouthSouth, 
as a high energy configuration (Figure 3). The majority of particles will align in a 
low energy state so that the net alignment is with the external magnetic field. 
Absorption of a photon of energy is sufficient to convert a particle from the low- to 
high-energy configuration if the energy exactly matches the difference between 
the two states. During an MRI scan this energy is administered in the form of a 
radiofrequency (RF) wave. At the molecular level this RF pulse will convert a 
particle into the higher energy state. At the macroscopic level the magnetization 
vector moves away form the z plane towards the XY plane. At this point, the spin 
begins to return to the z plane and at the same time the RF energy is re-emitted 
providing the NMR signal. The time taken for the spin to return to the low energy 
state, is known as T1 relaxation time. 
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Figure 3. Properties of protons with spin in a normal and magnetic field 
Many protons possess the property of spin. This dictates that in a magnetic field 
they align themselves with or against the direction of the main magnetic field. 
Thus, when tissue is placed in a magnetic field, hydrogen protons align along the 
direction of the main magnetic field (z) which establishes an equilibrium 
magnetisation vector. Following a radiofrequency pulse orthogonal to the 
direction of the main magnetic field, particles are moved in to the higher energy 
state. The times taken for these particles to return to the low energy state is 
l<nown as T1 relaxation. During this relaxation energy is emitted in the 
radiofrequency range. 
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An isolated proton is only subject to the B0 field. In human tissue particles are 
surrounded by other protons with spin, and their magnetic fields interact. These 
temporary and random interactions, known as spin-spin interactions, result in a 
loss of phase, and therefore signal. This process is known as T2 relaxation. The 
T2 signal is determined by the chemical environment of each proton and is 
specific for different tissues. In this thesis the structural images that were 
obtained were T2 images. T2 decay only describes the loss of signal due to 
random spin-spin interactions, assuming a homogenous B0 field. In reality there 
are a number of factors that create inhomogeneities in the magnetic field. These 
include distortions at tissue borders, metal present in the subject, etc. The sum of 
all these effects, including spin-spin interactions is known as T2*. BOLD echo 
planar imaging, which is used for functional as opposed to structural imaging, 
relies on the T2* signal. 
Echo-planar imaging is a rapid MRI sequence which enables the acquisition of 
brain slices in a matter of seconds (Bruder et al., 1992; Farzaneh et al., 1990). 
Oxygen is paramagnetic, and thus the increased oxygen in a region in response 
to greater neural activity affects the local T1 and T2 parameters. 
MRI hardware; acquiring images 
The magnetic field is created by a superconducting electromagnet. The 
superconducting wires are some miles in length. They are bathed in around 1800 
litres of liquid helium in order to maintain a low temperature (4.2K) (Figure 4). 
The gradient coil is responsible for producing the gradient in the B0 field. The RF 
coils have a dual role. They serve both to create the B1 field which rotates proton 
spins, and to detect the MRI signal. 
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Figure 4. Figure IVIRI hardware for acquisition of functional IVIRI images 
The patient is moved into the bore of the magnet. The magnet produces the main 
magnetic field (B0). The gradient coils are responsible for directing magnetic 
fields in all directions (B0, x, y and z). The function of the radio frequency coil is 
to generate a magnetic field in order to rotate the direction of the proton spins as 
dictated by the pulse sequence, but in our case 90°. The RF coil also detects the 
MRI signal. The scanner incorporates a shield (not shown) which deflects RF 
pulses and minimises the extent that the magnetic field projects away from the 
core of the magnet. The computer controls the gradient pulse programmer which 
governs the RF pulses. The RF amplifier then increases the power of these 
pulses about a 1000 fold. The gradient pulse programmer is controlled by the 
computer, and these signals are also amplified before reaching the gradient coils. 
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The BOLD response and neurovascular coupling 
Functional MRl is concerned with the activity of groups of neurones. Neuronal 
synaptic activity requires energy and it is this energy use that makes functional 
MRl possible. Functional MRl relies on the BOLD response (blood-oxygen level 
dependant imaging) (Figure 5); a measure of the difference between the 
magnetisation of oxy- and deoxyhaemoglobin. Charles Sherrington demonstrated 
that stimulation of neurones was associated with increased blood flow in 1880 
(Roy and Sherrington, 1890). We now know that evoked or spontaneous brain 
activity is associated with increased cerebral blood flow (CBF). Sherrington also 
showed that this recruitment of oxygenated blood is greater than is required for 
the given neural activity (Fox and Raichle, 1986), which leads to a build up in 
local oxygenated haemoglobin (Hb). 
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Figure 5. Neurovascular coupling; how neuronal activity gives rise to the 
BOLD signal 
Neurones do not contain large stores of energy in the form of oxygen and 
glucose. During neuronal firing, oxygen consumption increases by about 5% and 
biood flow (and therefore oxyHb) to the local area increases by 20 - 40%. As a 
result, neuronal activity Is paralleled by an increase In oxygenated blood, or 
oxyhaemoglobin. OxyHb is diamagnetic, and has no magnetic properties, 
however, deoxyHb, present after oxygen has been transferred to the neurones, is 
paramagnetic. During neural activity, the change In proportion of oxygenated and 
deoxygenated blood can be detected by the scanner magnet, due to their 
difference in magnetic susceptibility. Thus the raw EPI data acquired during a 
functional imaging scan is a three dimensional representation of the BOLD 
response at each voxel through time 
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Neural activity leads to energy use fuelled by the extraction of oxygen from 
oxygenated Mb in the surrounding blood vessels. This increase in oxygen 
consumption results in an increase of blood flow to the local region, one that is 
greater than is required to meet the increased oxygen consumption. The result is 
a greater local concentration of oxygenated Hb. The increase in CBF is known to 
take up to 5 or 6 seconds, and is followed by an undershoot. The time course of 
this change in the local ratio of oxy- to deoxyHb is known as the haemodynamic 
response function or HRF. Oxy- and deoxyHb have different magnetic properties 
(oxyHb is diamagnetic and deoxyHb is paramagnetic). Therefore, the IVIR signal 
originating from one cerebral region depends on the ratio of the local 
concentrations of the two molecules in the blood. Thus, fMRI visualises regions 
of the brain that recruit more oxygen during a given task. From this an inference 
is made about local net synaptic activity. 
To what extent does the BOLD response reflect neural activity, what kind of 
neural activity and how closely are they correlated in space? Logothetis and 
colleagues (2001) carried out experiments in which they measured neural activity 
using electrodes and simultaneously acquired BOLD fMRI data in macaque 
monkeys. Their data revealed a good degree of spatial correlation between the 
BOLD signal and the neural signal in the visual cortices. As predicted, they also 
showed that the BOLD signal lags behind the neural changes, in a roughly linear 
manner. The temporal correlation between the BOLD signal and neuronal firing is 
better for short rather than long presentations of stimuli (Logothetis, 2003; 
Logothetis and Wandell, 2004). There are a number of neural processes that 
may contribute to the BOLD signal, and these investigators demonstrated that 
BOLD signal predicted local field potential, and then spiking activity and multiunit 
activity best (Logothetis et al., 2001; Logothetis and Wandell, 2004). These 
processes reflect the net input and intracortical processing of a region, as 
opposed to the output. Other studies have shown a good correlation between 
BOLD signal and neural processing in visual cortices. Rees and colleagues 
(2000) looked at the correlation between macaque neuronal activity and human 
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fMRI data. Their data demonstrated that around nine action potentials per 
second per unit related to a 1% BOLD signal change. Mukamel and colleagues 
(2005) recently looked at single unit activity in the human auditory cortex whilst 
subjects watched a film. They then used this activity as a regressor in a 
subsequent fMRI data set, using the same stimuli, and revealed a good 
correlation between the two parameters. In summary, BOLD activity is well 
correlated with neural activity as seen by single and multi unit recording studies. 
Whilst it is thought that the relationship between neural activity and vascular 
activity is linear, the exact relationship is likely to vary across brain regions. 
Certain regions, for example, have a richer vascular bed than others, and the 
neurovascular relationship may be more closely coupled within these regions. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that cognitive states may influence this 
relationship. For example, Arthurs and colleagues (2004) recently demonstrated 
that a distractor task reduces the BOLD response to a somatosensory stimulus 
but not the evoked response as measured by EEG. This data implies that the 
relationship between neural activity and the BOLD response is not necessarily 
constant. 
Functional localisation of brain activity using fMRI 
Phrenology and functional localisation 
Lesion studies in experimental animals, particularly in non-human primates, 
demonstrated the extent of functional localisation in the brain. As one example, it 
was shown that lesioning premotor cortex resulted in deficits in visuomotor 
learning (Halsband and Passingham, 1985). Experiments in healthy volunteers 
have provided parallel findings by means of imaging techniques. Thus the 
prevailing vision of the human brain is that different cortical (and subcortical) 
regions subserve different aspects of cognition. 
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Cognitive Subtraction 
Functional MRI provides the means to assess the role of cortical areas in the 
healthy human brain. The technique relies on the premise that, by comparing 
brain activity in two tasks which only differ in some small way, we can identify 
brain regions specific to a given task; a approach known as the subtraction 
method. Functional MRI can only provide information about activity in one 
condition relative to another: it does not give an absolute measurement, a 
handicap when compared to the measure of firing rate afforded by single cell 
recordings. 
In a standard fMRI experiment there are two or more conditions. Comparison 
between conditions demonstrates differences in BOLD responses. Providing the 
behavioural states of contrasted conditions are appropriately determined, the 
'subtractions' will reveal the functional anatomy of sensory, motor or cognitive 
functions under investigation. Two assumptions are made during this type of 
subtraction (Friston et al., 1996). First, it has to be assumed that there is 'pure 
insertion': that is, the contrast reveals localised activity which directly reflects the 
behavioural difference between the activation and baseline tasks, without 
unsuspected interactions. Thus, for example, a contrast of listening to a list of 
real words to a list of pronounceable non-words might be interpreted as 
demonstrating activity associated with access to verbal meaning. In practice, the 
assumption of pure insertion would be unwarranted if other cognitive processes, 
such as auditory attention or episodic memory encoding of the stimuli, were 
dissimilar for the two sets of stimuli. The second assumption is that the 
relationship between the neural activity and the MRI signal is linear. A third 
confound, which is not unique to functional imaging, is how to interpret a null 
result, particularly when study populations are small in size. It has to be accepted 
that the local absence of BOLD activity in an fMRI analysis cannot be used as 
solid evidence that that region is not involved in a task. 
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Correlations vs causality 
Functional fIVIRI is a correlational technique and it does not infer causality. In 
other words, fMRI demonstrates regions that are active during a task with greater 
or lesser statistical reliability, but a robust activation does not imply that a region 
is essential for performance of the task under investigation. This requires 
converging evidence from a lesion study, either as a result of focal brain 
pathology or temporarily induced with TMS. Under certain circumstances 
inferences can be made from lesion studies in animals. 
Analysis of fMRI data: Statistical Parametric Mapping 
Human brain mapping has been carried out since the late 1980's in the form of 
PET studies, and even earlier with 2D imaging techniques using radioactive 
xenon (Friston et al., 2006). At this time, analyses were carried out by creating 
regions of interest (ROI) and carrying out analysis of variance on these regions 
across a group of subjects. This approach was limited when there was no a priori 
prediction about where to place the ROIs. A major advance occurred when 
software became available that analysed the whole brain, voxel by voxel (Friston 
et al., 1999). These methods generated the spatial distribution of t-values 
(usually transformed into z-scores) for each voxel, a statistical parametric map 
(SPM). Formulation of SPMs involved use of an analysis of covariance, where 
global activity was treated as a confound. The problem with looking at global 
changes as opposed to ROIs had two major drawbacks. One was to ensure that 
voxels in different subjects' brains were identically, or at least very similarly, 
located, despite the interindividual variability in brain shape, size and distribution 
of sulci and gyri. The second was the problem of multiple comparisons when 
analysing many thousand of voxels distributed across the whole brain. 
I now describe the image preprocessing steps and statistical analytical methods 
that I used when analysing my data. 
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Slice Timing 
During acquisition of any fiVIRI data set an issue of slice timing arises. Our 
scanning protocol for EPI data uses a repetition time (TR) of 3 seconds. This 
means that each full brain data set takes seconds to acquire. The slice timing 
problem refers to the fact the last slice will be acquired at a different point in time 
to the first slice. In SPM5 the model is specified relative to the start of the scan, 
thus the slice timing problem results in poor estimates for the later slices 
compared to the earlier slices. SPM5 slice timing correction uses interpolation to 
model how the data would look if all slices had been acquired at the same point 
in time. There are problems with this approach however, as the interpolation is 
imperfect. Furthermore there is no answer as to whether one should slice time 
correct or motion correct first. If there is a lot of motion, slice time correction, 
which resamples the data in time, the interpolation will occur across voxels that 
do not correspond but appear to correspond due to movement. If you motion 
correct first the slice timing correction is affected. 
An alternative solution is to ignore slice timing correction and to use a temporal 
derivative instead. The temporal derivative allows for more flexible onset times of 
around +/- 1 second. Due to the relatively short TR of 3 seconds and the 
presence of movement in the data, it was decided under the advice of the SPM 
staff, to motion correct, but not the slice time correct. 
Realignment/ registration 
A typical functional imaging scan can last from minutes to an hour or so. During 
this time it is impossible to keep the head completely still. Movement of the head 
in the scanner can lead to artefacts that manifest as apparent activations'. This 
step of the preprocessing pipeline corrects for changes of head position between 
volume acquisitions. This is an important step in fMRI data processing as any 
changes due to head motion are likely to be much larger than any changes due 
to brain activity. Unfortunately, brief movements time-locked to a task, such as 
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jaw movements during speech production, will not be removed by realignment. 
Alternative techniques have to be used to deal with this problem. I made the 
assumption, after piloting, that the arm movements required for my studies would 
not result in movement artefact that would interfere with my results. Movement of 
the brain due to the cardiac and respiratory cycles, although a problem when 
attempting to image the brainstem or spinal cord, are considered to be negligible 
when investigating the cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres. 
There are a number of available approaches to registration. The shape and 
volume of the brain and the data acquired throughout the scan will not vary. Thus 
a rigid body registration is sufficient to correct for head motion. In SPM5, the 
software that I used in all my analyses (www. this involves the alignment of two 
images using a 6-parameter ridged-body transform (Figure 6). This is performed 
by obtaining the rotations and transformations that provide the optimal measure 
across the images. In SPM5, this is done by obtaining the minimum sum of the 
squared differences between the two images. This process produces data on the 
amount and direction of head movement during the scan relative to a designated 
volume with which all other volumes will be coregistered (in practice, I used the 
10*"^  volume as often naive subjects had a startle response to the scanner noise 
at the commencement of study). Data from subjects who moved more than 3mm 
across a study in any one direction were discarded in order to limit movement 
artefact and associated type II errors. 
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6 parameter rigid body transformation 
Figure 6. SPM5 uses a 6 parameter rigid body registration to move all the 
raw EPI images into the same orientation 
Each data set undergoes a rigid body realignment which corrects for head motion 
during the scan. During this stage, each slice is moved so that it is aligned with a 
target slice (this can be any slice). The data is then transformed in 6 directions so 
that all slices match up. 
Segmentation and normalisation 
Individual brains vary greatly in size and shape. In order to make any kind of 
inference about what region of the brain is involved in a given task it is important 
to first ensure that the same brain regions are being compared across subjects. 
Each individual data set needs to be put into standard sterotactic space so that 
the same brain regions are being compared across subjects, as far as is 
possible. 
The first step in this process involves the segmentation of the structural T2 image 
into grey and white matter. This process also produces a bias-field corrected 
structural image and writes parameters for the spatial normalisation and inverse 
normalisation. These parameters can be used to normalise the functional data. In 
other words, during segmentation the structural image is warped into standard 
space. During the normalisation stage the parameters for this are applied to the 
functional data so that they are also in standard space. Normalisation moves the 
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data from subject standard space into a standardised space in order to allow 
comparisons across subjects. This step involves minimising the sum of squares 
between the source and template images, in the same way that the rigid body 
transform does. However, given that different subjects brain anatomy varies in a 
nonlinear manner, this stage requires an affine transform using 12 parameters, 
rather than the 6 parameter rigid body transform used for coregistration. Initially 
the brain is matched to the template images followed by the affine transform 
which estimates nonlinear deformations between the two images. 
Smoothing 
There are two major reasons for smoothing fMRI data. The first is to remove high 
frequency noise and increase signal-to-noise in the data. The second is, as far as 
possible, to account for imperfect anatomical normalisations due to individual 
variation in the distribution of gyri, sulci and cytotechtonic borders. It is possible 
to smooth fMRI data because neighbouring voxels are not independent. It uses 
the matched filter theorem which dictates that using a kernel (size of filter) 
matched to the size of the expected signal will give the optimal signal. It works by 
averaging the data in each voxel with the data in neighbouring voxels which 
results in a blurring or smoothing of the data. The kernel dictates the shape of the 
function that is used to smooth the data across voxels. This can be any shape 
but SPM5 smoothes the data using a Gaussian kernel which has the shape of a 
normal distribution curve. The kernel is described in terms of the full width at half 
maximum (FWHM). The process of smoothing takes each data point in the image 
at and each point a new value is calculated which takes into account both the 
original data point and surrounding data points using a Gaussian function. There 
are some circumstances where it is preferable to avoid smoothing. For instance 
when looking at individual subject fMRI data. This is discussed further in 
reference to multi voxel pattern analysis later in this chapter. 
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Statistical analysis offMRI data 
In functional MRI data the effect of any given stimulus is small compared to the 
background noise; it can be a little as a 1% change in the overall BOLD signal. 
As a result, much effort has been applied to designing statistical software 
packages that can reliably identify true physiological changes. There have also 
been publications that deal with the power of fMRI studies, and the minimum 
group size required for a particular study. Power calculations for functional 
imaging studies are only estimates, as predictions about effect size and variance 
within any one brain region in any particular study may be largely unknown. 
Based on these data I made the decision to include groups of between 18 to 25 
in all the studies I describe in this thesis. 
Fixed effects vs random effects 
A fixed effects statistical model is addressed in the first level analysis of fMRI 
data. This explores significant effects within the particular study population that 
has been studied, and indicates that the same result would be evident if the 
study was repeated on the same group of subjects. The second level analysis 
used a random effects model. The practical outcome of the much more stringent 
random effects model affords confidence that the same result would be found if 
the study was repeated in a different group of subjects with the same 
demographic profile (e.g. normal subjects of approximately the same age). 
During the fixed effects first level of analysis of grouped data, within-subject 
variance is estimated. The second random effects level of analysis accounts for 
between-subject variance, and ensures that one or a few subjects do not 
disproportionately affect the result. In other words, the random effects analysis 
accounts for the possibility of outliers' (unusually large or small effects), and 
population-level inferences can be made with some confidence. 
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standard RFX group analysis 
I have used random effects for group analysis throughout this in order to be able 
to generalise the inferences over a wider population. In this section I will outline 
the process of first level analysis (fixed effects on individual subjects which 
estimates the individual variance) and second level analysis (random effects 
which estimates both within- and between-subject variance). 
The first level (or fixed effects) analysis involves fitting the general linear model 
(GLM) for each individual subject. The GLM is a model of expected BOLD 
responses given the specific onsets of the experimental conditions. This model is 
specified within SPM in the design matrix. It specifies the onsets and durations of 
each experimental condition in a box-car design (Figure 7). The model takes into 
account the haemodynamic response function and the random error. The HRF is 
a standard canonical HRF comprised from one or more gamma functions. When 
convolved with the box-car model this accounts for the delay between neural 
activity and BOLD response. 
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Figure 7. Modelling the BOLD response within a design matrix 
In order to make any inferences from our fMRI data a model is created against 
which hypotheses can be tested. The model is described in the design matrix 
(lower panel). In order to create the model, the onsets and durations of each 
experimental condition are specified and deconvolved with a standard 
haemodynamic response function (HRF). The canonical HRF, as modelled with 
in SPM, is an assumed profile of the vascular response and the summed result of 
local neuronal activity. The peak is set at around 6 seconds followed by a longer 
overshoot. Therefore, the HRF shown in the middle panels is representative of 
the canonical HRF employed in the analyses. Thus the design matrix is a 
description of what we would expect to see if there was an effect of any 
condition. This is then compared to the real data in order to assess if there are 
significant effects present. 
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Having built tlie model or design matrix the next step is to estimate the 
parameters for each subject. This stage investigates which voxels in the data set 
act in the way predicted by the design matrix, and estimates both the signal and 
the noise (the effect and the variance). By now comparing both of these factors 
during task A compared to task B it can be determined which voxels show a 
BOLD response that is significantly greater during task A than task B. Each effect 
of interest is specified using a contrast vector which produces a parameter 
estimate for each voxel. These are' then converted into 3D images known as 
contrast images. Each contrast image represents the weighted sum of the 
parameter estimate for any given contrast (task A - task B). The contrast images 
are a spatial summary of activations for an individual subject during the activation 
task relative to the baseline task. 
Thresholding and correction for multiple comparisons 
Making inferences from fMRI data typically involves comparison of large numbers 
of data points. Each data set is comprised of around 200,000 z-scores (one for 
each voxel in the brain) which are all compared to one another (Figure 8). With 
these large numbers, even using a standard statistical threshold of p<0.01 (z= 
2.33), there may be up to 2000 (1% of 200,000) significant voxels due to chance. 
This multiple comparisons problem requires some form of correction for multiple 
comparisons. A traditional method for dealing with this issue is Bonferroni 
correction. However this method does not take into account the fact that all the 
voxels of fMRI data are not truly independent but display spatial correlation. In 
the majority of fMRI data sets, the z-scores of any one voxel are highly correlated 
with the values of nearby voxels. Consequently, Bonferroni correction is often too 
conservative for use on fMRI data (Nichols and Hayasaka, 2003). 
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Figure 8. Second level analysis involves one way f-test at each voxel 
At the second level analysis, contrast images from each subject for one particular 
effect is entered into a general linear model. A one way t-test is applied to each 
voxel to test for a significant effect. This results in a t- statistic image which can 
be appropriately thresholded to produce a map displaying all significant group 
effects. 
Within SPIVI5, there are two ways of correcting for multiple comparisons: family 
wise error (FWE) and false discovery rate (FDR) (Friston et a/., 2006). 
Throughout this thesis I have applied a correction using the false discovery rate. 
Whereas the alternative (controlling the FWE rate), which uses Bonferroni and 
random field methods are robust at excluding Type I errors (false positive), the 
proportion of Type II errors (false negative) is unacceptably high (Nichols et a/., 
2003). FDR correction is a compromise between Type I and II errors; it allows the 
control of the proportion of false positives among voxels which survive 
thresholding (Genovese et a/., 2002). This approach takes into account the 
amount of signal in the data as it is derived from the distribution of p-values. For 
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example, if after thresholding the data there are 1000 significant voxels, using a 
FDR=0.3 predicts that 700 of those would be correct and the remaining 300 
would be false positives. In this thesis I have used an FDR<0.01, reducing Type I 
errors to involve only 1% of all significant voxels displayed. 
The proportion of false positives was reduced further by including a cluster 
threshold. This was achieved by limiting the number of clustered displayed to 
those that comprise >25 adjacent voxels that survive the voxel-level statistical 
threshold. False positives will be randomly spread throughout the data, whereas 
meaningful active voxels are lil^ ely to be clustered together as a result of 
populations of activated neurones. 
Region of interest analyses 
If there is an a priori hypothesis about the involvement of a specific brain region, 
region of interest (ROI) analyses can be carried out. This serves to increase the 
SNR and reduce the problem of multiple comparison. In SPM there is a toolbox 
available for this specific purpose. By defining an ROI, either from significant 
activations revealed by the RFX or according to anatomical criteria, it is possible 
to extract the mean time course for each voxel of the ROI. Standard statistical 
tests can then be carried out on these data within SPSS statistical software. 
It is problematic to compare main effects between ROIs, as it is not established 
that the neurovascular coupling is uniform throughout the brain. For this reason, 
ROI analyses might be considered most reliable when comparing the effect size 
within one regions across tasks. However, an exception was made for comparing 
the response in homotopic regions between hemispheres. 
Alternative methods of analysing fMRI data 
There are many alternative ways of analysing fMRI data, once the GLM has been 
created. For example multi voxel pattern analysis allows us to look at the spatial 
distribution of activity in the brain (Peelen and Downing, 2007; Peelen et al., 
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2006). This can be done across the whole brain or within regions of interest. One 
of the most simple ways to do this is to look at the spatial pattern of statistical 
values in condition A compared to condition B. In addition to a traditional 
analysis, I use two variations of this approach to multi voxel pattern analysis in 
Chapter 3 to investigate whether the patterns of significantly active voxels are 
correlated for observation and execution of action. 
Localisation of brain activity 
There are a number of problems with anatomical localisation of functional 
imaging data. Accurate localisation relies mainly on the success of normalisation 
so that each voxel can be allocated to a specific anatomical site with confidence 
(Brett, Johnsrude et al., 2002). For example, localisation to primary motor cortex 
is reliable as the central sulcus is relatively constant between subjects. This does 
not apply to high order cortices. Thus, for example, BA9 and 46, which are 
adjacent in prefrontal cortex show considerable intersubject variability in size and 
distribution (Rajkowska and Goldman-Rakic, 1995). 
One solution to this problem is the use of cytoarchitechtonic probabilistic atlases 
to identify the location of significant activations. These atlases are created by 
comparing histological and cytoarchitechtonic analyses of post-mortem brain 
slices and relating them to MR images normalised into sterotactic space. Using 
the toolbox available within SPM, any focus of activation can be attributed to a 
particular brain region with an estimate of the probability of its location. 
Unfortunately, to date probabilistic atlases have only been created for a limited 
volume of the cerebral hemispheres. 
Functional MRl: Expehmental Design 
Throughout this thesis the scanning parameters were kept constant: A 3 tesia (T) 
Philips system was used to acquire 226 T2*-weighted echo-planer images (EPI) 
data (2.2 x 2.2 x 2.75 mm3, TR/TE/flip 3000ms/30ms/90°) using BOLD contrast. 
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An eight-channel array coil and SENSE factor 2 were used as well as second-
order shims. From each experiment the first five volumes acquired were 
discarded in order to remove the effect of T1 equilibration. T2 anatomical volume 
images were also acquired for each subject. 
Subjects 
All gave informed consent according to the guidelines approved by Hammersmith 
Hospital Ethics Committee who provided local ethics approval for this study. 
Functional data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK) running on Matlab 7.2 (Mathworks Inc, Sherborn, 
MA). All functional images were realigned to the first volume by six-parameter 
rigid body spatial transformation. Functional and structural (T2-weighted) images 
were then normalized into standard space using the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) template. Functional images were then coregistered to the T2 
structural image and smoothed using a Gaussian l^ ernel of full width half medium 
(FWHM) 8 mm. The data were high-pass filtered at 128 Hz. First level analysis 
was carried out using motion parameters as regressors of no interest at the 
single-subject level. A random-effects model was employed in which the data 
were corrected for multiple comparisons using the false discovery rate (FDR) at a 
threshold of p < 0.05 to limit false positives (Curran-Everett, 2000; Genovese et 
al., 2002). Voxelwise thresholding was carried out at 20 voxels to limit potential 
type II errors. 
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Chapter 3: Transitive and intransitive actions in the 
human mirror system; implications for simulation theory 
Human mirror neurones? 
Mirror neurones are individual cells that respond during both execution and 
observation of object-directed actions (di Pellegrino et a/., 1992; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese et ai, 1996). To date these cells have been found in area F5 of 
the ventral premotor cortex, PF of the inferior parietal lobe and more recently 
primary motor cortex (Tkach et al., 2007). This discovery has been hailed as a 
milestone in neuroscience, as these cells provide a neuronal link between the 
internal and external world. It is suggested that these cells may underlie a 
number of cognitive processes in the human brain and subsequently the last ten 
years has seen a wave of attempts to identify the human equivalent. 
Single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can be used to measure 
corticospinal excitability and thus provides an indirect measure of cortical 
excitability. This approach has been used to demonstrate that human motor 
cortices are active during action observation (Fadiga et al., 1995) in a roughly 
somatotopic manner (Strafella and Paus, 2000). This phenomenon has been 
confirmed with both electroencephaphy (EEG) and magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) (Han et al., 1998; Oberman et al., 2005). Gallese (1996) has pointed out 
that activity in primary motor cortex may be facilitated by activity in premotor 
cortex, either by direct connections or via the brainstem. Whilst for the most part 
these studies have looked at primary motor cortex, non-invasive imaging has 
revealed that there is distributed activity in premotor and parietal cortices during 
action observation (Grezes et a/., 2003; lacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Matelli etal., 1996). 
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Despite a wealth of indirect evidence, no study to date has provided direct 
evidence for the existence of human mirror neurones (Dinstein, Thomas et al., 
2008). Most imaging studies of the human mirror system have failed to include 
execution conditions, which is a clear requisite for fulfilling the definition of a 
mirror neurone, and therefore a human mirror response. Instead, many studies 
have simply looked at action observation (Dapretto et al., 2006; lacoboni et al., 
2005). Other issues include the absence of a control for observing a moving limb 
or the use of intransitive, non-goal directed object actions. Both of these points 
are central to the macaque mirror response, and thus seem necessary for any 
investigation into the presence of mirror neurones in the human brain. 
In summary, there are a number of issues that exist in research into human 
mirror responses. Nonetheless, it is widely held that a human mirror system 
exists in premotor and parietal cortex, as in the macaque brain. It is unclear 
whether common encoding revealed by non-invasive imaging techniques reflects 
the activity of mirror neurones, as opposed to two closely adjacent or overlapping 
but distinct populations of cells (see Downing et al., 2007), one responding to 
visual sensation and the other to motor output. In other words, it is important to 
recognise the limited spatial resolution of standard fMRI analyses relative to the 
neurophysiological techniques from which the concept of mirror neurones arose, 
in fMRI the smallest unit of spatial resolution is a single voxel, which has 
dimensions in the order of a few mm^. 
Looking at spatial distributions across voxels 
One way of approaching this problem is to look at the spatial pattern of activity in 
unsmoothed single subject fMRI data using multivariate pattern analysis 
techniques (MVPA). Execution of a specific action is represented by a unique 
pattern of neuronal firing. This pattern encodes a number of attributes such as 
the goal of the action in space (Graziano et al., 2002), trajectory of the limb 
through space (Georgopoulos et al., 1986), specific forces (Kakei et al., 1999) 
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and velocities (Reina et al., 2001) required for each muscle involved. Thus, each 
action has a unique pattern or neuronal signature associated with it. If mirror 
neurones serve to map observed actions onto existing schemata for executing 
those same actions, I expected to see the same neuronal pattern, or signature, 
for action execution and observation. I investigated the underlying spatial pattern 
of significantly active voxels across execution and observation of actions 
conditions (Figure 9). 
t-values for each voxel 
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Figure 9. Overview of multivoxel pattern analysis 
Activity in any given region across two conditions A and B, may be due to the 
activity within a singie population of cells that is active in both conditions, or may 
be due to the activity of two or more populations with separate functions within 
that region. The former state might be reflected by correlated spatial patterns of 
activity in the two conditions (left panel) and the latter by different patterns of 
significant voxels (right panel). By investigating the spatial distribution of t-
statistics, we can assess whether there is a correlation between the spatial 
pattern of activity in conditions A and B. We can then compare this to the 
correlations in that region for tasl<s C and D. 
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This approach is ideally suited to looking at the human mirror system for a 
number of reasons. During the stages of preprocessing, fMRI data is smoothed 
in order to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (as discussed in the methods 
section). This technique uses unsmoothed data, which minimises the blurring 
between neighbouring voxels that may be active during execute and observe. 
Furthermore, this approach looks at spatial patterns in individual subjects. This is 
ideal for two reasons. First, there is likely to be individual variations in these 
neural signatures, as the spatial pattern for a specific action may well be different 
in two individuals. Second, in order to look at group data, individual subject data 
has to be warped into standard space, so that all voxels can be compared. 
Investigating spatial correlations in individual subjects avoids errors produced by 
warping into standard space, and reduces the possibility of seeing the same 
voxels active in 'Execute' in some subjects and in 'Observe' in other subjects, 
which might occur with a group analysis. 
Using individual analyses, therefore, reveals the correlation between the multi-
voxel spatial patterns during executing an action and observing that same action. 
The presence of a significant spatial correlation would indicate that the same 
population of cells were active across these two conditions, providing compelling 
(although still indirect) evidence for a true human mirror system. 
Discrepancies in the current MVPA literature in relation to 
mirror neurones; object and non-object directed action 
This multivariate pattern analysis approach has been adopted in a two recent 
studies. However, the results have been inconclusive. Dinstein and colleagues 
(2008) report a null result for obsen/ing and executing hand gestures, suggesting 
that there are overlapping but distinct neuronal systems, and not a unified mirror 
system in parietal and premotor regions. In contrast, Etzel and colleagues (2008) 
found that the fine spatial pattern of activation for hearing an object-based action 
predicted the pattern of activation for executing the same action. 
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I predict that the discrepancy between these two findings may be due to the 
nature of the actions used. More specifically, I argue that the previous negative 
finding (Dinstein, Gardner et a/., 2008) may be due to the lack of an object in the 
actions used. There are a number of reasons for this assertion. First, the original 
macaque studies demonstrated that true mirror neurones are not active in the 
absence of an object (Gallese et al., 1996). Umilta and colleagues (2007) later 
showed that these cells are even active when the actual grasping action is 
hidden behind a screen, but only if the monltey believes there is an object behind 
the screen. Thus, the presence of a goal is essential in triggering mirror neurone 
activity in macaques. Second, we know that the presence of an object in 
obsen/ed actions results in a greater premotor and parietal response in humans 
(Buccino et al., 2001). Based on these two points, we argue that object-directed 
action may be a more salient cue for the mirror system. 
The relevance of object-directed versus intransitive actions goes to the heart of 
what constitutes the mirror system. If the mirror system is a general purpose 
system for coordinating action and execution, with a central role in mediating 
learning new behaviours and imitation, then it is likely that the system should not 
be tied to actions mediated by objects per se but should be more general 
purpose. However, another possibility is that the mirror system, instead of driving 
learning is the consequence of learning about actions which are both executed 
and observed, and which then elicit firing of some of the same underlying neural 
populations through Hebbian learning (Heyes, 2001; Keysers and Perrett, 2004), 
This second possibility would implicate greater mirror responses for highly salient 
and frequent actions that have induced greater Hebbian learning, such as actions 
used in manipulating objects and eating food. 
in order to assess the potential role of objects, a defining property of macaque 
mirror neurones, I conducted an fMRI experiment comparing action execution 
('Execute') and action observation ('Observe') with an object-directed or transitive 
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action (OT and ET) and a non-object directed action. For the latter we used an 
intransitive hand wave (01 and El). I predicted that I would find a correlation 
between multivoxel spatial patterns of activity during executing and observing 
object-directed actions (OT/ET) exceeding that for intransitive actions (OI/EI). 
One of the challenges of presenting ecologically valid object-directed actions in 
an experiment is that we typically observe actions as we execute them, and 
separating these two aspects can be highly artificial. Here, to avoid this problem I 
allowed subjects to observe as well as execute actions. This design decision 
means that some of the activation in the execution condition will have reflected 
observation of the action. This, therefore, does not constitute a true measure of 
the human mirror system. However, it did allow me to compare the response to 
observing and executing an action mediated by an object, and the response in 
the absence of an object. As such, the system I observed would reflect the 
maximum possible extent of an object-based and a non-object-based mirror 
system, and differences between the two would provide information about what, 
if anything, is special about object-directed actions. 
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Experimental details 
Subjects 
Twenty-two healthy right-handed subjects (mean age 27 + 3.81 (s.d.), 8 female) 
participated in this study. All gave informed consent according to the guidelines 
approved by Hammersmith Hospital Ethics Committee, who provided local ethics 
approval for this study. 
Individual contrasts were carried out to investigate the BOLD response to each 
condition minus baseline. Conjunction analyses were carried out by inclusive 
masking (Observe masked inclusively by Execute), allowing visualization of the 
BOLD response present in response to both action execution and action 
observation (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Experimental overview for identification of human mirror 
responses 
In order to Identify tiuman mirror responses, BOLD activity during a pen grasp 
(Execute Transitive, ET) compared to an intransitive hand wave (Execute 
Intransitive, El). The same contrast was carried out for observation of a pen 
grasp (left side). This baseline was used in order to control for visual processing 
of a moving biological limb, a prerequisite for a macaque mirror neurone. I then 
looked at the observe contrast, inclusively masked by the execute contrast. This 
limits the results so that the only remaining voxels are independently significant 
in the Execute and Observe conditions. Throughout this thesis, the term human 
mirror response refers to this form of analysis. 
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Multivariate pattern analyses 
Region of interest analysis 
These analyses were carried out in collaboration with Dr Leech. Data were 
processed using the AFNI toolbox (Cox and Savoy, 2003), FSL (Smith et al., 
2004) and Matlab 7.2 (Mathworl^s Inc, Sherborn, MA). The only preprocessing 
step used was motion correction using AFNI. Subsequently, a general linear 
model (GLIVI) was calculated based on the unsmoothed data using AFNI. 
Smoothing is normally carried out to increase signal to noise, and to minimise 
minor anatomical differences between subjects by blurring the data over 
neighbouring voxels. As this method is applied to single subject data we can 
avoid smoothing and as a result retain some higher resolution information. The 
GLM model included separate regressors for observation and execution for both 
object and non-object conditions as well as nuisance variables modelling mean 
activation, linear and quadratic trends and head movement. The GLM model 
resulted in spatial maps of t-values, which formed the basis of subsequent 
multivariate pattern analyses to determined spatial overlap. 
During the stages of preprocessing, fMRI data is smoothed in order to increase 
the signal-to-noise ratio (as discussed in the methods section). This technique 
uses unsmoothed data, which minimises the blurring between neighbouring 
voxels that may be active during execute and observe. Furthermore, this 
approach looks at spatial patterns in individual subjects. This is ideal for two 
reasons. First, there is likely to be individual variations in these neural signatures, 
as the spatial pattern for a specific action may well be different in two individuals. 
Second, in order to look at group data, individual subject data has to be warped 
into standard space, so that all voxels can be compared. Investigating spatial 
correlations in individual subjects avoids errors produced by warping into 
standard space, and reduces the possibility of seeing the same voxels active in 
'Execute' in some subjects and in 'Observe' in other subjects, which might occur 
with a group analysis. 
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The MVPA were run on individually defined regions of interest. First, a very broad 
anatomically defined mask was created in MNI-152 space, using the superior 
parietal and precentral gyral regions defined by the probabilistic Oxford-Harvard 
cortical atlas. This mask was then warped into each subject's native space using 
the FSL tool FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001). This anatomical mask was then 
combined with a functionally-defined mask for each subject encompassing the 
union of voxels active (uncorrected p<0.05) to all observe and execute 
conditions. As such, I focused on only those voxels implicated in both 
observation and execution, with and without an object. Therefore, I removed 
irrelevant voxels from the analyses, while maintaining "a level playing field" to 
assess whether there was greater spatial overlap for object-based than non-
object based movements. 
Within this union of anatomically and functionally defined masks, I assessed the 
spatial overlap between action observation and execution by correlating the 
estimated t-values across all voxels in the mask from the GLM for observation 
with execution separately for object and non-object analyses. This approach of 
correlating spatial patterns of t-values have been previously found to be a useful 
approach for assessing spatial overlap, since it controls for noise and 
summarises activation minus low-level activation (Downing et a!., 2007). The 
resulting r-statistics were then converted to z-statistics using the Fisher 
Transform (Fisher, 1915), resulting in two z-statistics for each subject, one 
summarising the overlap between observe/execute object (OT/ET) and the other 
for observe/execute non-object (01/EI). A subsequent paired t-test statistic was 
then calculated on the z-statistics across participants, to investigate whether 
OT/ET differed from Ol/El. 
Whole-brain analysis 
A variant of the above approach was also run on whole-brain data. Since there 
are local variations in activation in different brain regions, a spherical searchlight 
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) approach was taken that searches for fine-grained 
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spatial overlap within local areas. A 3-voxel wide sphere (containing up to 123 
voxels) was passed over the whole-brain, and the spatial correlation between the 
t-values for OT/ET and OI/EI were calculated within each sphere. The resulting r-
statistic was converted to a z-statistic and assigned to the centre voxel. In this 
way each the spatial overlap of the local neighbourhood surrounding each voxel 
was calculated. These maps of z-statistics in native space were then warped into 
MNI-152 space using FLIRT. Finally, a f-statistic was calculated for each voxel, 
evaluating whether there was a significant difference across subjects between 
the z-statistics for OT/ET and OI/EI. This probability map of object greater than 
non-object spatial correlations was then FDR-thresholded at p<0.05. 
Stimuli 
in the scanner, subjects were able to see a restricted area around their lower 
body using a mirror mounted on the head coil. By raising their knees a board 
could be placed on their lap, ensuring actions were carried out within their visual 
field. Subjects were manually cued either to carry out an action or observe the 
experimenter carrying out an action. The action required them either to reach out 
and grasp the object placed in front of them in an appropriate manner for that 
object, or to execute an intransitive action. Following the observation cue 
subjects were asked simply to observe the actions carried out within their visual 
field. The baseline condition consisted of the stationary board alone. The same 
board was used for all experimental conditions. I compared brain BOLD 
responses to action and observation of these actions in a block design paradigm. 
Each scan consisted of six conditions repeated four times; observe transitive 
action (OT), observe intransitive action (01), executed transitive action (ET), 
executed intransitive action (El), and observe object and baseline. The executed 
actions were self-paced. Each condition lasted for 21 seconds and was 
separated by a six second instruction block. The blocks were organised in 
pseudo-random order. Thus, the entire task lasted 11 minutes. 
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- Results -
Common encoding of action execution and observation in 
premotor and parietal cortices 
In the standard group-based whole-brain analyses, object-directed action in both 
execute and observe conditions was associated with significant BOLD activity in 
bilateral dorsal premotor and parietal cortices, corresponding to BAG and 7. 
These data confirm previous work (Grezes et al., 2003). No such activity was 
seen during execution and observation of intransitive action. By investigating the 
main effects of action observation and action execution I demonstrated that 
regions within this network are significantly more active in response to OT and 
ET than during 01 and El (Figure 11). The lack of response in primary and 
secondary motor cortices in response to 01 is consistent with macaque data 
(Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese et al., 1996) and highlights the importance of object-
directed actions in triggering a mirror response. 
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Figure 11. Bilateral premotor and parietal 'mirror responses' for object-
directed action 
BOLD responses to observing a pen grasp over observing intransitive movement 
were masked with BOLD responses to executing a pen grasp over executing 
intransitive movement (inclusive mask, p<0.001, FDR 0.05, k= 20). This allowed 
me to highlight voxels that were commonly activated in observing and executing 
a pen grasp more than executing and observing intransitive movement. Such 
analyses revealed significant activations in bilateral premotor and parietal 
cortices (28 -48 56, -28 -52 58, 28 -14 56, -30 -4 60, -36 -38 52). The reverse 
contrast, 01 over OT, inclusively masked by El over ET, revealed no significant 
voxels in these regions. 
85 
Spatial overlap of transitive and intransitive action execution 
and observation 
An anatomical and functionally defined masl< was created for each subject in 
their native space, focusing on the union of voxels active in all four action 
conditions (observe/execute for both object and non-object). Within these 
premotor and parietal regions, there was a high degree of individual spatial 
variation in the mirror response (Figure 12). However, the greatest overlap was in 
dorsal premotor and parietal cortices in both hemispheres. (Left SPL -34,-59,64, 
n=12, RPL 36, -42, 52 n=10; LPrlVIC -48, 2, 35, -42, -9 , 58 n=10). There was no 
overlap in these individual masks in more than 12 subjects, which highlighted the 
individual variability in action execution/observation matching systems. These 
coordinates broadly agree with the whole-brain analysis, but unlike the whole-
brain approach, demonstrated the considerable individual variability across 
subjects. 
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Figure 12. Individual variability in premotor and parietal mirror responses; 
significant differences between transitive and intransitive actions 
A mask was used to restrict my analysis to regions significantly active in Observe 
and Execute conditions (voxels active for all four conditions, p<0.05; within an 
anatomically defined mask of premotor and parietal regions). These individual 
masks varied across individuals in widespread premotor and parietal cortices 
bilaterally (Figure a). Within these individual masks, I then investigated the mean 
correlation between Obsen/e and Execute for the two difference action 
conditions; transitive and intransitive. The mean correlation between Observe 
and Execute was significantly greater for transitive compared to intransitive 
action (Figure b). 
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1 then compared the correlation in spatial patterns of activation for Execute and 
Observe for transitive action (OT/ET) with that for intransitive action (OI/EI). The 
spatial pattern of f-values within this mask for observe and execute were then 
correlated for both transitive and intransitive conditions. I observed a significantly 
greater correlation for the goal-directed action than for the intransitive action 
(Figure 12b). The additional control comparison, correlating observing a static 
object with executing a pen grasp, did not differ from chance, and was 
significantly smaller than the correlation between OT/ET. 
These first analyses were restricted to a theoretically determined anatomical 
region of interest. I therefore wanted to see whether there may be other regions 
in the cortex that displayed correlated spatial patterns, but which did not achieve 
significance in the group conjunction, and whether there were differences in 
lateralisation. To assess this I passed a spherical searchlight over the whole 
brain assessing the spatial overlap of the local neighbourhood surrounding each 
voxel. The resulting map of spatial correlations was contrasted for transitive and 
intransitive action in x, y and z. 
In this brain-wide analysis I found significant correlations between Execute and 
Observe, greater for transitive compared to intransitive action, in the left post-
central gyrus (BA3), inferior frontal gyrus and within prefrontal cortex. The 
reverse contrast revealed significant correlations in superior parietal lobe 
corresponding to BA7 (Figure 13). 
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a. Positive correlations for OPEP compared to OWEW 
Figure 13. Brain wide analysis of spatial correlations 
In addition to the ROI analysis shown in Figure 11,1 also carried out a brain-wide 
search in order to see if there were any other cortical regions displaying a spatial 
correlation between Execute and Observe conditions. A spherical searchlight 
was applied to the whole brain and significant correlations were compared for 
Observe transitive and Execute transitive (OT/ET) and Observe intransitive and 
Execute intransitive (OI/EI). Figure a shows spatial correlations were greater for 
OT/ET compared to OI/EI in left frontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus and 
postcentral gyrus (BA3). The reverse comparison revealed significant 
correlations in left superior parietal lobe corresponding to BA7 
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At a lower threshold (p<0.001) I also observed correlations in left premotor and 
parietal areas corresponding to BAG and 7 (-20 -11 63, -20 -73 64, data not 
shown), but these did not survive correction for multiple corrections. A significant 
anticorrelation was seen in left superior parietal lobe corresponding to BA7. This 
effect was driven by decorrelated patterns of activity in OT/ET compared to Ol/Ei. 
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- Discussion -
This study had two objectives. The first was to address the issue of transitive and 
intransitive action within the mirror system, and the second was to investigate 
spatial correlations between action execution and observation for both these 
movements. There are discrepancies reported in two previous experiments that 
employed a similar approach (Dinstein, Gardner et a/., 2008; Etzel et al., 2008), 
which I propose are due to the absence or presence of an object in the actions 
used. 1 confirmed the existence of a human mirror response to a real object in a 
network of regions, including bilateral ventral precentral gyrus, premotor cortex, 
superior temporal sulcus, parietal lobe and cerebellum. I report for the first time 
the presence of correlation of spatial patterns of BOLD activity in bilateral 
premotor and parietal regions, both comprising what is referred to as the human 
mirror network. Moreover, there was a greater mirror response in these regions 
for transitive compared to intransitive actions. These data indicated that the 
mirror response to purpose-associated objects overlapped with, but were not the 
same as, mirror responses to abstract objects (Grezes et al., 2003). In addition, I 
report a significantly greater correlation for transitive compared to intransitive 
actions. This has implications for the design of experiments investigating the 
human mirror response, and may explain why previous studies have reported 
conflicting results. 
Distinguishing between mirror neurones and mirror-like 
neurones 
Not all common visual and motoric encoding seen in fMRI studies such as this 
reflect mirror neurone activity. For example, we know that canonical neurones 
exist in the same areas; cells which respond during execution of an action and 
during observation of the related object (Grezes et al., 2003). My data supported 
this finding, and indicates that within the overiap of Execute and Observed, that 
in the past has been labelled the 'mirror response', only a proportion may be 
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explained by mirror neurones. There is a degree of overlap that must be 
explained by the presence of separate cells responding to execute and others 
responding to observe, within a voxel commonly activated in both conditions. 
Transitive actions are central to the mirror response 
The stark contrast between the activity seen during observing a pen grasp and 
observing a hand wave highlights the importance of an object or a goal in action 
perception. Not only did I observe premotor and parietal activity when an object 
was present, I also observed much higher correlations for OT/ET. This indicates 
that object affordance is highly salient information. Furthermore, the correlation 
between spatial patterns in OT/ET compared to OI/EI in parietal cortex indicated 
that, if there are the same populations of cells firing during both, these 
populations are tuned to transitive action. These data highlighted the difference 
between what is referred to as goal-directed action and object-directed action. 
Dinstein and colleagues (2008) used goal-directed actions, in that their actions 
were Rock, Scissors or Stone actions; the formation of these actions arguably 
constitutes a 'goal'. Our data indicate that there is a clear difference between 
their meaningful goal-directed actions and meaningful object-directed actions. 
it could be argued, however, that these correlations were driven by the visual 
processing of an object, which was present in both OT and ET but not 01 or El. 
Neurones that respond to the presence of a three-dimensional object are known 
to reside in BA7 of the parietal cortex (Culham et al., 2006). However, if this were 
the case the same correlations between ET and OT would be expected, which 
was not what I observed. This correlation did not differ from chance. Thus, the 
difference between transitive and intransitive actions is unlikely to be mediated 
entirely by neurones in the parietal cortex sensitive to the presence of an object. 
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Consequences for simulation theory 
This clear dissociation between encoding of object and non-object directed 
actions has implications for simulation theories of motor cognition. Such theories 
assert that observed actions are mapped onto motor representations in order to 
support imitation and other higher cognitive processes, such as action 
understanding or prediction. If the mirror system was the substrate of such a 
system, why would it discriminate between transitive and intransitive directed 
action? Non-object directed action is arguably more difficult to imitate, given that 
there is no affordance from the object to aid execution of an action. Furthermore, 
intransitive actions tend to be more communicative than object-directed actions, 
and thus if there were to be any difference in the way mirror systems respond to 
action, one might expect the opposite response profile; a greater role for 
intransitive actions than for object-directed actions? An alternative theory is that 
the mirror response may be a Hebbian association between the networks 
involved in execution and observation. Object-directed actions tend to be 
executed under the guidance of visual feedback (pen grasping, cup grasping, 
etc.), whereas intransitive movements such as waving, thumbs up and other 
gestures are perhaps less so. This is even more the case for familiar transitive 
actions compared to unfamiliar intransitive actions. One possible proposal that 
may explain these findings is that the mirror response is an epiphenomenon of 
the fact that generally one executes and observes the same actions 
simultaneously, and perhaps the mirror response is a result of associations 
between these networks (Heyes, 2001; Keysers and Perrett, 2004). Such a 
theory Is supported by the demonstration that these paired associations in the 
motor system can be artificially manipulated by simultaneously executing one 
action whilst observing another (Catmur et al., 2008; Catmur et al., 2007). 
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Why did we see correlations in AlP and not in premotor 
cortex? 
AlP is known to encode object affordance, and this information is passed forward 
to F5 where potential actions are stored (see Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). The 
presence of an object may account for this result in AlP. Activity within bilateral 
premotor and parietal cortices is associated with observation of transitive action. 
Furthermore, I report a greater correlation between OT/ET compared to OI/EI in 
these regions. This may explain discrepancies in previous findings, where one 
study, which did not use object-directed action, reported a null result (Dinstein, 
Gardner et a/., 2008) and another demonstrated the opposite (Etzel et al., 2008). 
My data indicated that this may be the reason for the null result, and 
demonstrated the importance of object-directed action in activating any 
hypothetical mirror neurone population. 
The two types of action have been reported to be differentially encoded in terms 
of action observation; Buccino and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that 
observation of transitive actions and not intransitive actions elicits activity in 
parietal cortex. It is known that patients with limb apraxia may show dissociations 
between transitive and intransitive actions (Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000). Non-
human primate data indicate that execution of distal hand movements is 
associated with firing in AlP (Gallese et al., 1994), and execution of arm reaching 
movements with firing in posterior IPS. My data confirmed these findings with 
respect to arm reaching movements, and furthermore indicated that the 
populations of cells firing in OT and ET in parietal cortex may be the same. This 
latter point cannot be confirmed from this experiment, however, as there may be 
visual processing of a limb movement in both the Observe and Execute 
conditions. 
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Decorrelations in superior parietal cortex 
My data showed that the pattern of activity in somatosensory cortex during 
Observe and Execute were anticorrelated during OT/ET compared to OI/EI. This 
indicated that there is some form of inhibition of activity in either OT or ET that is 
not occurring during 01 and El. It is well established that the sensory 
consequences of internally generated actions are 'gated' (Blakemore et al., 2001; 
Blakemore et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 1998). Furthermore, a recent study has 
shown that activity is greater in somatosensory cortices during Observe 
compared to Execute (Agnew and Wise, 2008; Rossi et al., 2002). In fact. 
Execute was below baseline. It may be that this decorrelated activity relates to 
the suppression of sensory activity during the Execute condition. 
Lateralisation of transitive action 
It is traditionally thought that contralateral sensorimotor cortices are the driving 
force during execution of an action. However it is normal to see some degree of 
ipsilateral activity in these regions. My data indicated that spatial correlations are 
significantly higher in both hemispheres during observation or execution of a right 
limb movement, although there is a left bias. A recent study which addressed 
lateralisation in the mirror system demonstrated that even when controlling for 
the limb used and the visual field of presentation, the mirror response is bilateral 
(Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). This was confirmed by TMS (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002; 
Heiser et al., 2003), which showed that MEP facilitation is associated with the 
limb used in the observed action. The left bias in my data is most likely due to the 
fact that all observed actions were right-handed actions. 
Comparing correlations for OT/ET and OI/EI 
My data indicated that there is a higher spatial correlation for OI/EI in parietal 
BA7, compared to OT/ET. This region is known to be important in visuomotor 
coordination such as reaching-to-grasp. The intransitive hand wave was 
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predominantly a proximal movement. Given that this region of the parietal cortex 
is l(nown to be involved with gross arm movements more than fine hand 
movements (Desmurget et al., 1999), this may explain this result. An alternative 
explanation may be that in the absence of an object, emphasis is placed on the 
somatosensory feedback produced during the hand wave. IVIacaque recording 
studies have shown that cells in this areas respond during tactile stimulation and 
also during vision of impending tactile stimulation (Hyvarinen and Poranen, 
1974). IVIore recent studies have reported somatosensory 'mirror' effects in the 
parietal cortex (Blakemore et al., 2005; Keysers et al., 2004). 
Confounds; visually driven correlations and attention 
The transitive and intransitive actions differed in more than just the presence of 
an object. The former was a meaningful action whereas the latter was 
meaningless. As a consequence, there is a possible contribution of semantics in 
this premotor and parietal system. This could be ruled out by demonstrating the 
same result when comparing meaningful transitive and meaningful intransitive 
actions. Observations of meaningful actions are encoded in different regions of 
the brain compared to meaningless actions. Regions activated by both include 
the right cerebellum, the dorsal visual pathway and bilateral premotor regions. 
IVIeaningful actions specifically resulted in additional activity in the supplementary 
motor area (Grezes, 1998). More importantly, it seems that the level of encoding 
or attention has a strong effect on the pattern of cortical activity. If subjects were 
instructed that they would have to imitate the observed action after viewing it, 
meaningful and meaningless actions triggered a differential response. If imitation 
was not thought to be imminent, the pattern of activity in the two conditions was 
the same (Grezes, 1998). This highlights the care that is required in designing 
such delicate cognitive paradigms. This raises the question that if motor 
encoding of viewed actions are involved in interpreting intentions of others, to 
what degree does the ambiguity of the action intention play an important role? 
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Another potential confound in this study is the role of attention in the posterior 
parietal cortex (Behrmann et al., 2004). It is conceivable that observing an object 
directed action is more 'interesting', thus engaging attentional systems more than 
observing an intransitive action. There are a number of reasons that I argue 
against this idea: First, if the presence of an object was engaging attentional 
processes, we would expect to see the same parietal activity during the 
observation of a static object, which I did not. Secondly, previous studies have 
indicated that increased attention to a motor event is associated with increased 
activity in left parietal cortices (Rushworth et al., 2001) and this result is bilateral. 
In summary, my data indicated that within what is commonly thought of the 
human mirror network, there is spatially correlated activity across multiple voxels. 
This implies the potential existence of common encoding of action execution and 
observation in the same population of cells. The most important finding from this 
experiment was the clear difference in mirror responses for transitive and 
intransitive actions. I have discussed the implications of these data as a potential 
explanation for why spatial correlations have not been reported in previous 
investigations of this nature. The next experiment addresses the role of object 
familiarity in the mirror response. 
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Chapter 4: Investigating the familiarity of limb/object 
interactions on the human mirror response 
The previous experiment was designed to confirm the existence and location of a 
human mirror response. These data demonstrated a clear difference between 
mirror responses for object and non-object directed actions. Thus object-directed 
action is an important factor in generating a mirror response both in macaque 
and human brain. It is widely held that mirror neurones, cells observed to 
respond during both execution and observation of an action in the non-human 
primate, are the neural substrate of observation evoked activity in the motor 
system. Despite the relative lack of evidence, it has been suggested that the 
human mirror system is involved in cognitive processes such as inferring an 
action intention (Gallese et a/., 1996; Gallese and Goldman, 1998; lacoboni et 
al., 2005; Keysers and Perrett, 2004). This has become incorporated into what is 
known as the 'direct matching hypothesis' or simulation theory. According to this 
idea 'an action is understood when this observation causes the motor system of 
the observer to 'resonate', (Rizzolatti et al., 2001, p.661), hence the term motor 
resonance. 
Simulation theory 
There is a wealth of evidence indicating that observed actions are mapped onto 
motor schema. TMS studies have demonstrated that IVIEPs are facilitated during 
action perception (Fadiga et al., 2005; Fadiga et al., 1995) in a manner that 
reflects both the spatial (Strafella and Paus, 2000) and temporal (Gangitano et 
al., 2001) dynamics of the observed action. A study has shown that eye 
movements during action observation are similar to those during action 
execution, providing support for direct matching in action perception (Flanagan 
and Johansson, 2003). This model has gained support from the demonstration in 
non-human primates that an important aspect of action observation in triggering 
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mirror neurones is the intention to act as opposed to the completion of the act 
(Umilta et al., 2007). Furthermore, data from the previous chapter indicates that 
object and non-object directed actions result in very different patterns of activity 
in sensorimotor cortices. Indeed, non-object directed actions did not elicit any 
activity in these regions. This implies that not all actions are 'simulated' in the 
same manner. 
It has been noted that pure motor simulation is not sufficient to support action 
understanding or inference (Jeannerod, 2001) but requires either prior 
knowledge or contextual cues. These environmental cues originate from the 
environment or from the object. For example, when observing a hand reach to 
grasp a pen, there are a number of possible actions that could follow, such as 
grasping to write or grasping to move the pen. Motor simulation alone cannot 
discriminate between these two actions, proving they use the same motor 
parameters. Jeannerod (2001) points out that prior knowledge of the situation is 
required to accurately predict motor events is such a situation. This knowledge 
can be semantic or can arise from cues in the environment. For example, a pad 
of paper adjacent to the pen indicates that a hand reaching to grasp the pen is 
about to execute writing. In humans, lacoboni and colleagues (2005) have 
demonstrated that observing actions with contextual cues available from the 
environment increased BOLD responses in inferior frontal gyrus and ventral 
premotor cortex. However, no study to date has investigated the role of object 
affordance in the mirror system. This study aimed to address this issue by 
comparing mirror responses to familiar and unfamiliar objects. 
So how does the nature of the object affect the human mirror response? One of 
the most convincing investigations into the presence of a human mirror response 
was carried out by Grezes and colleagues (2003). While well designed, this study 
provideds limited information about intention inference. For example, it is 
suggested that mimicking a grasping action carries intentional information, and 
thus for my investigation human 'intentionless' movement was employed as a 
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control condition. Furthermore, the object employed in this study was a 
specifically constructed 'manipulandum'. As subjects had no prior motor 
experience of this object, it would therefore lack associated action semantics. 
Moreover, Johnson and Grafton (2003) have distinguished between 'acting on' 
and 'action with' objects. Acting on' involves moving an object whereas 'action 
with' is the grasping of an object in order to use it. The latter requires 'over-
learned postures necessary to achieve the goal'. Calvo-Merino and colleagues 
(2005) have demonstrated that activity associated with viewing actions that are 
part of one's own motor repertoire, and represented in motor cortices, is different 
from activity associated with viewing novel actions. Although neither of these 
studies in humans included an action execution condition, overall these data 
suggested that actions with an established motor representation are encoded in 
a differential manner to unfamiliar actions. Informed by these previous studies, I 
designed this project to investigate the response of the human mirror system to a 
real object in comparison to a manipulate unfamiliar object. 
The mirror response as a consequence of Hebbian 
associations? 
It is currently thought that mirror neurones and human mirror responses may 
underlie simulation theory. However, the results from the previous experiment 
show that there is a clear dissociation between action execution and perception 
of transitive and intransitive action. To summarise, I found a network comprising 
bilateral premotor and parietal areas that was significantly active during 
execution and observation of transitive, but not intransitive, actions. IVIoreover, 
the correlations of spatial patterns underlying this activity were significantly 
greater for transitive compared to intransitive actions. These findings have 
implications for theories that propose the mirror system underlies action 
recognition, understanding or imitation (simulation theory) because such a 
system should not discriminate between these two types of action. Both are 
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central to human behaviour and both are subject to the cognitive processes 
implicated in simulation theory. 
An alternative interpretation for the mirror response is that it may be a 
consequence of sensorimotor coupling, without an explicit function. A number of 
authors have detailed models of Hebbian mechanisms that could explain the 
development of the mirror response (Heyes, 2001; Keysers and Perrett, 2004). 
Furthermore, artificial manipulation and modification of such coupling has 
recently been described (Catmur et al., 2007). In this experiment, subjects were 
asked to observe a simple finger movement, which produced enhanced MEPs in 
the corresponding muscle. During a training period, subjects performed the same 
finger movement whilst observing a different finger movement. The authors 
reported that after training the subjects had formed associations between the 
original finger movement and the representation of the new finger movement. 
Thus, observation of the new finger movement triggered facilitation of the MEPs 
in the muscle involved in the original movement. A similar finding has since 
confirmed these results (Catmur et al., 2008). Whilst this demonstrates a 
mechanism by which the mirror system may develop, this plasticity of paired 
associations also indicates that these associations may be arbitrary pairings of 
executed and observed movements, a notion that neurons that fire together wire 
together" (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14. A model of Hebbian development of the mirror system 
It is suggested that the mirror system is the result of i-iebbian associations 
formed between the neural networf<s involved in action execution, observation of 
one's own action and subsequent observation of other's action. Hebbian learning 
refers to the idea that two cells that fire at the same time may be altered so that 
firing in one cell increases the chances of firing in the other cell. Self-produced 
actions are associated with activity in frontoparietal areas, including macaque 
area PF and F5. These areas share reciprocal connections. PF also shares 
reciprocal connections with STS; an area that contains neurones active during 
observation of action, both during self produced actions and during observation 
of actions of others. During self-produced action, activity in F5-PF network may 
become coupled to activity in the STS-PF network in the Hebbian manner It is 
then suggested that observation, and indeed audition, of non-self-produced 
actions, which results in activity in STS and thus the STS-PF pathway, triggers 
activity in the originally motor pathway between F5-PF. Thus, the mirror property 
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emerges from a non-mirroring system. IHowever, there are also pathways that 
connect STS and IFG via the extreme capsule, thus it is unclear how this system 
is constrained (Schmahmann and Pandya, 2006). 
Aims and objectives 
To summarise, there are two issues; either the mirror system is involved in some 
form of motor simulation, or it may be an epiphenomenon of the sensorimotor 
associations formed during normal execution of actions under visual guidance. 
The former would predict that there should be a greater response in the mirror 
system for unfamiliar objects compared to familiar, and the second hypothesis 
would predict the opposite. 
This debate generates predictions. If the mirror system evolved to support the 
inference of intention, one may expect that it is more active when the intention is 
difficult to extrapolate. Conversely, if the mirror response is a Hebbian 
consequence of visual and motor networks firing together, one may predict that 
activity is greatest for familiar overlearned actions. With this prediction, the 
present study contrasted mirror responses to a familiar object, a pen, with well 
established visuomotor coupling, and an unfamiliar object of similar size and 
weight which should have no such coupling but will engage any system that 
extracts inferred intention. 
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- Experimental Procedures -
Subjects 
Twenty healthy right-handed subjects (mean age 27 ± 3.81 (s.d.), 8 female) 
participated in this study. All gave informed consent according to the guidelines 
approved by Hammersmith Hospital Ethics Committee who provided local ethics 
approval for this study. 
Stimuli 
In the scanner, subjects were able to see a restricted area around their lower 
body using a mirror mounted on the head coil. By raising their knees a board 
could be placed on their lap, ensuring actions were carried out within their visual 
field. Subjects were manually cued either to carry out an action or observe the 
experimenter carrying out an action. The action required them either to reach out 
and grasp the object placed in front of them in an appropriate manner for that 
object, or to execute an intransitive action. Following the observation cue 
subjects were asked simply to observe the actions carried out within their visual 
field. Within each run the object was either a pen or an unfamiliar object (Figure 
15). The Observe baseline condition consisted of observation of the stationary 
board alone; the same board was used for all experimental conditions. We 
compared brain BOLD responses to action and observation of these actions in a 
block design paradigm. Each scan consisted of five conditions, repeated four 
times: observe pen grasp, observe unfamiliar object grasp, execute pen grasp, 
execute unfamiliar object grasp and observe a stationary background as a low-
level baseline condition. The executed actions were self-paced. Each block 
lasted for 21 seconds and was separated by a 6 second instruction block. The 
blocks were organised in pseudo random order. Thus the entire task lasted 8 
minutes. 
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Figure 15. Stimuli: familiar and unfamiliar objects 
In order to look at mirror responses to familiar and unfamiliar objects, subjects 
were asked to either execute or observe actions made toward one of the two 
objects. The familiar object was a pen as this is an object with which everyone 
has motor experience (b). It is also an object associated with visual observation 
of one's own action, as picking up a pen to write is almost invariably performed 
under visual guidance. If the mirror response is a result of unconstrained 
associations made between visual and motor networks, it should be greatest for 
this type of action. The unfamiliar object was an artificially created object of a 
similar size and weight (a). Both objects had Velcro fasteners so that they could 
be placed on the stimulus board and removed with minimal movement. 
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- Results -
Observing actions toward familiar and unfamiliar objects are 
encoded differentially 
The distributed activity associated with observing familiar and unfamiliar actions 
versus a static baseline is displayed in Figure 16. Observing a pen grasp was 
found to be associated with increased activity in bilateral parietal, premotor and 
extrastriate cortex (the last located within visual motion area V5), and within the 
left parietal operculum. Activity associated with observing an action made on an 
unfamiliar object was associated with activity in the same areas with additional, 
more distributed activity in the left and right intraparietal sulcus. A direct 
comparison of Observe Unfamiliar with Observe Familiar demonstrated 
increased activity in both intraparietal sulci (Figure 17). 
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Figure 16. Interactions with a familiar object compared to observing a static 
bacl(ground 
Observing a familiar object grasp compared to observing a static background 
was associated with distributed activity in visual processing areas, including 
striate and extrastrlate cortex (FDR 0.05, cluster threshold 20). Additional activity 
was observed In bilateral precentral gyrus (BA6), right superior temporal gyrus 
partly overlapping with 0P1 of parietal operculum, right parietal operculum, left 
precentral gyrus (BA44), bilateral temporal pole and right fusiform gyrus. 
Executing a familiar object grasp v/as associated with significant activity in left 
precentral gyrus (BA6), bilateral cerebellum, bilateral V5/MT, right postcentral 
gyrus (BA3a), bilateral parietal operculum (0P1), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus 
(BA44). Note that there were activations in the inferior frontal gyri in the Observe 
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conditions, but not after controlling for observing a limb (Figure 17) or when the 
contrast was inclusively masked with execution of an action. 
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Execute UhfamWmr > Execute Familiar 
Figure 17. Interaction with an unfamiliar compared to familiar object is 
associated with in bilateral parietal regions 
A direct comparison of BOLD responses associated with observing an unfamiliar 
object grasp relative to observing a pen grasp revealed activity in bilateral 
parietal areas corresponding to the anterior parietal sulcus (FDR <0.05, cluster 
threshold 20). The same comparison for executed actions was also associated 
with bilateral parietal activity and additional activity in left premotor cortex (BA6). 
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Mirror responses to unfamiliar objects were associated with 
increased activity in the intraparietai sulci 
In order to identify which brain regions may reflect mirror responses, activity 
associated with observed actions was inclusively masked with activity associated 
with executing actions. This Identified voxels commonly activated In both 
conditions, that were not simply due to observing a moving limb. Mirror 
responses to familiar objects were observed In bilateral premotor (BAG) and 
parietal (BA2) areas, left parietal operculum (0P1), left cerebellum, and primary 
and extrastriate visual areas. Mirror responses to unfamiliar objects were 
observed in the same regions. Mirror responses that were greater for unfamiliar 
objects compared to familiar objects were seen within the post central gyri (BA2), 
close to the anterior intraparietai sulci (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. A more significant mirror response for interactions witli an 
unfamiliar object in parietal cortices 
Mirror responses (BOLD responses to observing and executing an action) were 
present when the subjects interacted with an unfamiliar object compared to a 
familiar object, and these were located in the left and right intraparietal sulcus, 
corresponding to area AlP ([Observe Unfamiliar - Observe Familiar], FDR <0.05, 
spatial threshold 20 voxels, inclusively masked by [Execute Unfamiliar - Execute 
Familiar] atp <0.001, uncorrected. 
The peak of these activations were localised using the probabilistic atlas of 
Eickhoff and colleagues (2005) (Figure 19). The peak activations lay between 
BA2 of the postcentral sulci and human intraparietal area 2 (hlP2), in a more 
lateral aspect of the anterior intraparietal sulci (Choi et al., 2006). 
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Figure 19. Localisation of peak BOLD activity between BA2 and anterior IPS 
Observing and executing unfamiliar object directed actions was associated with 
significant activity in parietal cortices, compared to the same conjunction of 
observing and executing actions made on familiar objects. Using the probabilistic 
atlas of Eickoff and colleagues (2006) the peak activations were localised to a 
point between Brodmann's area 2 of the post central sulcus and the anterior 
intraparietal sulcus, symmetrically in the two hemispheres. The top panel shows 
coronal slices of a structural image, with the hlP2 probabilistic atlas 
superimposed. The green points indicate the coordinates of peak activity in my 
data (mirror responses associated with unfamiliar compared to familiar object 
interaction). The bottom left panel shows a rendered structural brain image with 
the probabilistic atlases for both BA2 (purple) and hlP2 (green). My observed 
[eaks of activity lie between the two regions. The bottom middle panel indicates 
the location of hlP1 and 2 within the intraparietal sulcus. 
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- Discussion -
The present study investigated whether the human mirror system is sensitive to 
implicit information afforded by objects. A second hypothesis was that the system 
might be a consequence of associations between visual and motor networks for 
familiar object interactions. On the basis that the previous experiment 
demonstrated that the mirror response is specific to object-directed action, I 
hypothesised that if mirror responses are involved in object specific actions, the 
response would be stronger during an unfamiliar action. Based on macaque 
recording studies and subsequent computational models, I predicted that any 
differences would manifest in parietal cortex. If, however, the mirror response is a 
consequence of visuomotor coupling between regularly observed and executed 
events, the response would be stronger during familiar actions with well 
established coupling compared to unfamiliar actions. 
These data showed a more widespread mirror response to actions directed 
toward unfamiliar compared to familiar objects. Observation of interactions with 
familiar objects was associated with significant bilateral premotor and anterior 
parietal activity; whereas observation of unfamiliar object manipulation was 
accompanied by additional activity in more inferior rostral parietal areas. This 
indicates that the mirror system may have some influential role in encoding novel 
object interactions. If the mirror response were a consequence of visuomotor 
coupling, I would have expected to see a greater response during observation 
and execution of a well-coupled familiar action. This is not to deny that Hebbian 
coupling, in a more constrained form, is likely to be the mechanism by which 
mirror responses develop, as has been previously implied (Catmur et a/., 2007; 
Keysers and Perrett, 2004). 
I have confirmed the previously reported (Grezes et al., 2003) existence of a 
human mirror response to a real object in a network including bilateral premotor, 
anterior parietal regions and cerebellum. Mirror responses during practised motor 
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templates resulted in less activation in anterior parietal areas (corresponding to 
BA2). I also observed increased activity in visual cortices, which most lil<ely 
reflects increased visual attention to toward the unfamiliar objects. IPS is l<nown 
to play a role on mediating attention (for a review see Behrmann et a/., 2004). 
Thus it is possible that increased visual attention is the cause of increased 
activity in IPS. Unfortunately it is difficult to control for factors such as attention in 
fIVIRI studies and the design of this experiment is not sufficient to eliminate this 
possibility. However, previous studies have demonstrated that 'motor attention', 
attention directed toward one's own motor act, is a lateralized function 
(Rushworth et a/., 2001; 1997) Specifically, Rushworth and colleagues (2001) 
showed that the left supramarginal gyrus is involved in directing motor attention 
during left upper limb movements. In the present study subjects had to execute 
right limb movements and thus one would predict any difference in attention 
would have been manifest in one hemisphere only. Rushworth and colleagues 
(2001) did report AlP activity in motor attention, but again 'almost exclusively 
restricted to the left hemisphere'. Conversely, visuospatial attention is Itnown to 
be associated with right parietal activity Corbetta et al., 1993; De Renzi et al., 
1982; IVIesulam, 1981). Thus, while it is difficult to rule out the role of attentional 
differences between the familiar and unfamiliar conditions, I do not believe that 
this is the sole cause for my result in AlP. 
These data indicate that the mirror response to purpose-associated objects 
overlaps with, but is not the same as, mirror responses to unfamiliar or abstract 
objects. An alternative, given the location of the peak voxels within left and right 
BA2, might relate to the unusual tactile qualities of the unfamiliar object. Thus, it 
will have felt different (and novel) to the pen, and observing the novel shape may 
have elicited a somatosensory mirror response (Keysers et al., 2004). 
Given that the mirror system is thought to be involved in inferring the intention 
behind the action, it is intuitive that the response of the system is more 
widespread when observing an action that is unfamiliar. If the parietal activations 
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of interest were specifically involved in inference of action, one might predict the 
response in the execution conditions to differ less, as during action execution one 
presumably is aware of one's own intentions. My data displayed just that profile 
of activity: the difference between meaningful and non-meaningful action 
observation was much greater than the difference between the execution 
conditions. These data indicated that observing action recruits the majority of 
brain regions responsible for action execution. In other words, the motor 
'resonance' or echo (Gallese and Goldman, 1998) triggered by observing an 
action overlaps with a large part of the action execution network. This provides a 
possible mechanism by which the observed world could be encoded and 
interpreted in terms of one's own motor experiences. The fact that increased 
implicit information provided by the object in an observed action evokes a greater 
response in anterior parietal regions, indicates that interpreting intention may be 
a function of the human mirror system. 
A role for the anterior intraparietal area is central to 
extracting affordance? 
A range of data suggest that anterior inferior parietal area may be specifically 
involved in extracting affordance during the observation of visually-guided 
actions. When observing an action, visual information reaches primary visual 
cortex, where basic information such as colour and texture are processed 
(Boudreau and Ferster, 2004). The visual pathway is then thought to split into the 
dorsal and ventral pathways (Grafton and Ivry, 2004). The ventral pathway 
projects to the superior temporal sulcus, and then on to frontal regions, including 
the inferior frontal gyrus (Luppino et al., 2001) and premotor cortex (Wise et al., 
1997). The parieto-premotor pathway is involved in visually guided movement, so 
it is not surprising that it is active in both action execution and action observation 
conditions. The multimodal integrative nature of parietal association cortex is well 
described. A number of studies have shown that it is involved in action execution 
even in the absence of visual feedback (Desmurget et al., 1999; Desmurget et 
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al., 2001). The dorsal visual pathway projects to parietal cortex, and pathways 
from the parietal lobule provide the majority of the visual input to premotor cortex 
(Caminiti et al., 1996). As part of the network involved in the mirror response, the 
projections that run from parietal lobe to premotor cortex (Petrides and Pandya, 
1984) are thought to include directional encoding of intended movements 
(Johnson and Grafton, 2003), which includes a parieto-premotor pathway that 
passes through prefrontal cortex (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Together, 
this evidence supports the hypothesis that the human mirror network may 
support understanding of observed intention. 
My data indicated that anterior aspects of the parietal cortex were specifically 
involved in both executing and observing manipulation of unfamiliar objects. Cells 
in inferior parietal lobe, corresponding to the macaque anterior intraparietal area 
(AlP) (Frey et al., 2005), are known to respond during observation of an object 
(Sakata et al., 1995; Taira et al., 1990). Fagg and Arbib (1998) have developed 
the most well-known computational model of primate reaching-to-grasp, the 
FARS model. They concluded that the anterior intraparietal area is specialised 
for extracting affordance from observed objects, and that, upstream, the inferior 
frontal gyrus then selects the appropriate motor schema for grasping that 
particular object and it's affordance. The F5 then passes this information onto 
primary motor cortex for execution of this action. 
One problem with grouped fMRI data is the level of precision in the exact 
anatomical location of activated foci. By referring to a probabilistic anatomical 
atlas, I have located my anterior parietal activations to somatosensory cortex 
(BA2). Although this is usually considered to be unimodal cortex, there is now 
increasing evidence that cross-modal integration of sensory experiences occurs 
early in 'unimodal' sensory pathways (Shimojo and Shams, 2001). Figure 18 
plots the various 'centres of gravity' of activation foci in anterior parietal cortex 
across studies, to relate them to activated foci. All lie close together. Although the 
usual interpretation is one of visuomotor transformation, there is no reason why 
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the process may not involve visual-somatosensory-motor transformations, 
especially as similar profiles of activity have been reported in secondary 
somatosensory cortices (Keysers et al., 2004). 
In contrast to my findings, lacoboni and colleagues (2005) found that increasing 
the level of contextual information during observation of an action increased 
activity in IPG and ventral premotor cortex. This discrepancy may have occurred 
for two reasons; first, our study restricted responses to those that display a mirror 
response, i.e. are significantly active during both action observation and 
execution. We did not, for example, see a mirror response in IPG, a finding that 
has been previously reported in studies that have involved action observation 
and execution (Grezes et al., 2003). Second, it is possible that contextual clues 
from the environment, as manipulated in the former study, produced a different 
response profile to manipulation of object affordance as used in the present 
study. IPG constitutes a downstream part of the ventral visual pathway, a 
pathway known to be involved in object identification. Thus, it seems feasible that 
it may respond differently during actions performed in the presence or absence of 
background objects. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the present study has for the first time addressed the role of object 
familiarity on the human mirror response. I report that observation of unfamiliar 
actions recruits additional bilateral anterior parietal regions than observation of 
familiar actions. This implies that the mirror response is involved in processing 
unfamiliar object interactions. This indicates that the mirror response is not 
simply a consequence of incidental Hebbian coupling. I suggest that this may 
reflect the lack of action semantics associated with the unfamiliar object. This 
indicates a role for these regions for extracting intention-related information from 
ambiguous observed actions. Whether these cortical regions are essential for 
understanding action is a question which may be appropriately addressed using 
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TMS. These findings are central to eliciting the function of the human mirror 
system and have consequences for patient groups such as Autism and 
Schizophrenia who suffer from a dysfunctional ability to infer actions from the 
observed world (Dapretto etal., 2006). 
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Chapter 5. Discriminating between self and non-self 
within the mirror system 
I have previously discussed the existence of cells present in the macaque brain 
that commonly encode self-generated and observed actions. These cells provide 
a neuronal link between self and other, but it is not clear how they resolve who is 
the agent of motor events; if the same visuomotor cells are active during both 
execution and perception of an action, how are the two events discriminated in 
the mind of the agent? One of the core faculties of all higher organisms is the 
ability to distinguish self from non-self. In humans, the ability to correctly assign 
an event to an agent is fundamental to consciousness by providing a sense of 
self. The neuronal mechanism responsible for encoding the agent for any given 
motor event is as yet unclear. Theory suggests that systems responsible for 
motor control may be involved (see Blakemore et a/., 2001). The idea is that the 
mechanisms in place for assessing and controlling motor commands also 
determines or contributes to a sense of agency. 
A fon/vard model of motor control is the basis for a recent theory of agency 
attribution. Voluntary motor events necessitate a motor command. It has been 
long suggested that this motor command may be accompanied by an exact 
replica command, known as the efference copy (von Hoist, 1950). This 
suggestion originated from the demonstration that voluntary eye movements do 
not cause a sense of visual motion, whereas movements of the eyeball with the 
finger do. The efference copy serves to act as a reference against which afferent 
information can be compared. Such a feedforward system allows online 
monitoring and control of action. It has further been suggested that sensory 
match (between predicted sensory consequences estimated from the efference 
copy and actual afferent feedback) contributes to the sense of ownership of an 
action (agency) (Blakemore et a/., 2001; Wolpert et al., 1995). The converse, an 
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absence of efference copy and therefore sensorimotor mismatch, signals that an 
event is externally generated (For a review of see Ramnani, 2006). 
A number of studies have contrasted passive and active events in order to 
investigate this system (Blakemore et a/., 2000; Blakemore et a/., 1998). Other 
studies have indicated an alternative response to feedback afferent information, 
namely that when sensory consequences are predictable, such as those 
accompanying a self-generated event, sensory responses are suppressed. This 
effect has become known as sensory gating (Blakemore et a!., 1998; Roy and 
Cullen, 2004). A current theory is that this effect depends on an interaction 
between cerebral and cerebellar cortical areas (Blakemore et al., 1999). 
The first two experiments described in this thesis have confirmed that executed 
and observed actions are commonly encoded in a widespread frontoparietal 
network (Decety and Grezes, 2006; Fadiga et al., 1995; Grezes et al., 2003). As 
previously discussed, this is widely attributed to the activity of so-called mirror 
neurones (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Further, a proportion of activity associated 
with a self-initiated motor act represents processing of polysensory 
(somatosensory and visual) feedback afferent information. Similar sensory 
information is generated during externally imposed movements or when 
observing an act of another. Thus, actively and passively initiated movement 
share considerable overlap in functional anatomy (Guzzetta et al., 2007; Weiller 
et al., 1996). The question I address with the experiment described in this 
chapter is the neural system that distinguishes between these movements. This 
is central to 'agency'; namely, the ability to distinguish between movements of 
internal and external origin. 
Evidence that action execution/perception networks are involved in agency come 
from a handful of sources. Patients with apraxia suffer from deficits in the ability 
to perform actions. Sirigu and colleagues report three apraxic patients who would 
misattribute observed actions to themselves whilst executing an action in the 
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absence of visual feedback of their own action (Sirigu et al., 1999). The rubber 
hand illusion (Botvinicic and Cohen, 1998) is an established method for probing 
agency. A tactile stimulus is applied to the subjects own hand, which is hidden 
from view. Meanwhile subjects observe a tactile stimulus applied to a different 
hand, synchronously or asynchronously. The former results in attribution of the 
other hand as one's own. Haggard and colleagues have shown that in healthy 
subjects, single pulse TMS generated MEPs are facilitated when observing 
action, unless you attribute that action to yourself (Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2006). 
Their data showed that following observation of a tactile stimulus to a hand, 
corticospinal excitability differed depending on whether the subject attributed the 
action to their own hand or to another person's hand. When the subject believed 
they were watching their own hand being stimulated, MEPs were suppressed 
whereas when they believed they were watching somebody else's hand MEPs 
were facilitated. This experiment indicates that, in contrast to the direct-matching 
hypothesis, self and other are not similarly encoded in sensorimotor cortices. The 
question remains, however, as to how the mirror system can exist whilst allowing 
discrimination of the agent during observation of actions and execution of 
actions. 
A previous study has gone some way to addressing the response of the 
secondary somatosensory cortex (Sll) within the parietal operculum to self-
initiated and observed movements, using magnetoencephalography (Avikainen, 
2002). The authors discuss their results in relation to mirror neurone theory, and 
also discuss the possibility that suppression of activity in Sll may be involved in 
agency. The present study, using fMRI, was designed specifically to investigate 
functional dissociation within parietal opercular cortex that would indicate 
anatomical dissociation of the mirror and agency responses. 
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- Experimental details -
Subjects 
Twenty healthy right-handed subjects (mean ages 29, range 24-50, 8 female) 
participated in this study. 
Stimuli 
In the scanner, subjects were able to see a restricted area around their lower 
body using a mirror mounted on the head coil. By raising their knees slightly a 
board could be placed on their lap, ensuring actions were carried out within their 
visual field. Each subject's hands were placed by their sides on a horizontal foam 
platform outside of their visual field. This allowed them to carry out simple finger 
movements without seeing their hands or the experimenter. Whilst resting their 
hand on the foam platform, subjects were manually cued either to carry out a 
self-paced finger tap ('Active'), observe the experimenter doing the same 
('Observe') or had a finger tap imposed upon them ('Passive'). The passive tap 
was carried out by the experimenter using a finger support to move the subject's 
finger. Care was taken to ensure that the subject was unable to see any 
movement during this condition. The support used minimal contact with the 
subject's finger and was placed half-an-hour before experimentation to allow for 
habituation. Alternatively subjects had to view the experimenter's static hand 
when placed in their visual field ('Static') or a low level baseline of a stationary 
background ('Baseline'). 
Scanning and analysis 
We compared brain BOLD responses to active action, passive action and action 
observation of simple finger tapping in a block design paradigm. Each scan 
consisted of the three finger-tapping and two baseline conditions, repeated four 
times. Each condition lasted for 21 seconds and was separated by a 6 second 
instruction block. The blocks were organised in pseudo random order. Four 
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blocks of each condition were performed resulting in 84 seconds of continuous 
whole brain acquisition for each condition. The entire task lasted less than nine 
minutes. 
Individual contrasts were carried out to investigate the BOLD response to each 
condition minus baseline. Given the current debate over conjunction analyses 
(Friston et al., 2005; Nichols et al., 2005), identification of voxels common to 
execution and observation conditions was carried out using implicit masking at 
the group level. Significant BOLD effects from this implicit masking analysis were 
superimposed on a T2-weighted image from one of our volunteers normalized to 
standard space using the standard MNI 152-template. Local foci of maximal 
activation were then identified using cytoarchitechtonic and probabilistic atlases. 
Region-of-interest (ROI) analysis was carried out to investigate mean effect sizes 
in specific regions across all experimental conditions against baseline. Spherical 
ROIs with 4mm radius were selected from peak activations in the random effect 
analysis and created using the MarsBar toolbox that is available within SPM5 
(Brett, Anton et al., 2002) 
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- Results -
Activity associated with Active and Passive conditions 
The distributed activity associated with self-initiated finger tapping is displayed in 
below (Figure 20). Within left primary sensorimotor cortex there were separate 
peaks in primary motor (BA4) and somatosensory cortex (BA2) (Geyer et al., 
1996). There was accompanying activity in both parietal opercula. On the left this 
included both the medial and lateral extent (Eickhoff et al., 2006), whereas on the 
right activity was only observed in the lateral operculum (which was apparent 
even when the threshold was lowered to FDR p<0.2). There was additional 
bilateral activity in more posterior parts of the inferior parietal lobes. 
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Figure 20. Neural activations associated with Observe, Execute and 
Passive conditions are widely overlapping 
During the observation of a finger-tap versus a rest condition, (a) activity was 
observed in bilateral parietal operculum, anterior parietal, inferior frontal gyri and 
visual cortices including V5/MT visual motion areas (all contrasts FDR 0.05, 
extent 20). Active finger tapping (b) was accompanied by additional activations in 
ipsilateral cerebellum, contralateral primary motor cortex and supplementary 
motor area. Passively imposed finger movements also resulted in increased 
activity in similar areas, including contralateral somatosensory cortices, 
supplementary motor area, parietal operculum and inferior frontal gyri (c). The 
Static condition involved observing a static hand against observing a static 
background which was accompanied by increased activity in visual cortices and 
bilateral inferior frontal gyri (highlighted). 
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As expected, there was extensive activity in prefrontal, premotor and subcortical 
areas. This included the left and right ventrolateral premotor cortex, at the 
junction of BAG and 44, the left and right frontal operculum and midline premotor 
cortex, within the supplementary and presupplementary motor areas and motor 
cingulate cortex. In subcortical structures, activity surviving the statistical 
threshold was observed in both caudate nuclei, the left and right pallidum, the 
right pUtamen, and bilateral cerebellum (IV-V). 
Activity associated with Observe conditions relative to Static 
The contrast of Observed with Static controlled for activity in all visual processing 
areas, except for left and right area V5, cortex specialized for processing visual 
motion (Eickhoff et al., 2005). In addition, there was prominent activity in left and 
right parietal operculum. 
Passive movement of the right index finger revealed activity in left sensory cortex 
(BA1 and 2), with some activity in the homotopic region on the right (Geyer et al., 
1999; Geyer et al., 2000). This was accompanied by activity in the left and right 
parietal operculum, within second order somatosensory cortex (Eickhoff et al., 
2006). 
A direct comparison of the Active and Passive conditions was also performed 
(Figure 21). When active was compared with passive, the main outcome was 
strong activity within the midline cerebellum. There was evidence of greater 
activity in left primary motor cortex, but for the many other premotor, prefrontal 
and parietal regions activity was not significantly greater. When Passive was 
compared with Active the differences were confined to both parietal lobes. There 
was greater activity during Passive in both the left and right parietal operculum, 
and within left BA1 and 2. 
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A d t v t > P a s s i v e 
Figure 21. Active movements are associated with right cerebellar activity 
compared to passive movements 
Contrasting BOLD responses during b/oc/cs of active finger tapping with blocl<s of 
passive finger tapping revealed a right lateralised cerebellar activation that was 
specific to self-generated action (red, 4 -50 -20). The opposite contrast, which 
identified patterns of BOLD activity that were more correlated with passive rather 
than active finger tapping, were seen in bilateral parietal operculum and left 
anterior parietal lobes (blue) corresponding to BA2 (n= 20, FDR 0.01, k= 20, 48 -
30 26, 32 -36 62, -52 -22 50, -46 -28 24). The afferent input in both conditions is 
very similar, and thus the presence of somatosensory processing in Passive with 
respect to Execute demonstrates that during self-generated action sensory 
processing is suppressed or 'gated'. 
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Active, passive and observed finger movements share 
common neural responses 
These data demonstrated common activity for Active, Passive and Observe in 
bilateral parietal operculum (SII), and cerebellum. IVIirror responses, defined as 
significant BOLD responses during action execution and action observation, were 
seen in the lateral part of both parietal opercula. Conversely, the profile of activity 
in the right medial parietal opercula reflected that of an agency networlc; that is, 
there was activity associated with observation and passive finger movements but 
not self-generated finger movements. This dissociation between mirror response 
and agency networlcs is shown below (Figure 22). 
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Figure 22. Distinct regions within parietal operculum encode mirror 
responses and agency 
Inclusive masking was used to identify voxels common to both Observe and 
Active conditions with Static as a baseline condition. Clusters of 20 voxels or 
more that displayed this profile were defined as exhibiting a mirror response. 
Such mirror responses, seen in red, were obsen/ed in both parietal opercula 
(inclusive masking at 0.00095, FDR 0.05, spatial extent 20, at 62 -30 20 and -50 
-28 22). In order to highlight networks underlying agency encoding, seen in blue, 
voxels active during externally originating events were contrasted with self-
generated actions (Observe - Execute inclusively masked by Passive - Execute, 
inclusively masked at 0.00095, FDR = 0.05, spatial extent 20, peak activation at 
46 -22 22, which was used for an ROI analysis along with a symmetrical regions 
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at -46, -22, 22). The graphs display mean contrast estimates at these peak 
coordinates for all conditions against Baseline condition. Each ROI was a sphere 
of 4mm radius at each functional peak). Note that in the lateral extent of parietal 
operculum, the 'mirror" response. Execute is down with respect to Baseline and 
Static. Inset is taken from the probabilistic atlas used to localise these regions; in 
this image the green areas denote the 0P1 sub-division of SI! (Eickhoff et ai, 
2006). 
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- Discussion -
Mirror responses and agency overlap in right parietal 
operculum 
This study investigated how executed, observed and passive actions are 
distinguished from each other in the human, even though the associated sensory 
experiences are, in part, commonly encoded. These data showed that adjacent 
regions within secondary somatosensory cortex differentially encoded a mirror 
response and agency. A bilateral mirror response, defined as voxels commonly 
activated in executing and observing a finger tap, contrasted with observing a 
static hand, was observed in a caudolateral part of the parietal operculum, 
supporting previous findings (Keysers et al., 2004). Based on available human 
cytoarchitechtonic maps and a probabilistic stereotactic atlas (Eickhoff et al., 
2006; Eickhoff et al., 2005), the mirror response occured in so-called operculum 
1 (0P1) of second-order somatosensory cortex. It is proposed that this is the 
human homologue of monkey Sll (Eickhoff et al., 2006). Agency processing, 
demonstrated as a difference in activity between self-generated finger tap and 
finger tap that was either observed or externally imposed, was observed in a 
distinct rostromedial part of the parietal operculum. We speculate that this may 
lie in a region known in the monkey as parietal ventral area (PV) (Disbrow et al., 
2002), part of second-order somatosensory cortex that has a somatotopy 
independent of, but complementary to, that of Sll. It has been labelled as 0P4 by 
Eickhoff and colleagues (2006). 
The functional reasons for two adjacent somatosensory maps in monkey parietal 
operculum is unknown, but the present study has shown a clear functional 
distinction in the human. IVIapping of Sll and PV of the human parietal operculum 
has revealed that the hand representation in Sll and PV lie adjacent to each 
other, with PV lying rostral to Sll (Disbrow et al., 2000); as do our dissociated 
peak activations. These adjacent areas have very different patterns of anatomical 
131 
connectivity but do communicate with each other via short projections from SI! to 
PV (Disbrow et al., 2002). The dissociation we have observed confirms the 
hypothesis that secondary somatosensory cortex is likely to play a central role in 
distinguishing the agent in a system which, overall, responds to active, passive 
and observed actions (Avikainen, 2002). 
This dissociation reflects an interplay between efferent (feedforward) and afferent 
(feedback) information. Feedforward processes are based on internal models of 
action and efferent discharges. An ensuing action generates afferent feedback 
that allows the action to be monitored and, if necessary, subsequently modified 
(Kawato, 1999), until its execution becomes optimal (Desmurget and Grafton, 
2000). In contrast, imposed actions generate both visual and somatosensory 
feedback, but are not associated with a motor command or internal model 
(efference copy); observed actions of others generate only visual information 
without either efference copies or somatosensory feedback. Previous work has 
demonstrated that feedback processing involves BA2 of the postcentral gyrus 
(Seidler et al., 2004), an area known to be anatomically connected to the parietal 
operculum. Our results indicate that medial and lateral aspects of the parietal 
operculum differentially process the contributions from feedforward and feedback 
processes. 0P1 is known to share connections with BA1, 2 and 3 and, further 
afield, with premotor cortex (BAG and 44) and insular cortex in the macaque brain 
(Cipolloni and Pandya, 1999). These connections between sensory and motor 
areas are necessary for the Hebbian development of mirror neurone responses 
(Catmur etal., 2007; Keysers and Perrett, 2004). 
Whilst the dissociation that we report was only significant in the right hemisphere, 
the mirror response was bilateral. Recording studies imply that neurons in this 
region have bilateral receptive fields in response to visual and tactile stimulation 
(Robinson and Burton, 1980; Whitsei et al., 1969). One explanation for this 
lateralised effect arises from the arrangement of the experimental contrasts; for 
voxels to withstand significance in the agency contrast they have to be more 
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significantly active during observed and passive movements compared to the 
active execution condition. It is possible that the self-generated right finger tap 
might result in a relative asymmetry of activity within the parietal operculum, and 
this asymmetry masked an anatomical dissociation of response in the left parietal 
operculum. This right lateralised dissociation supports evidence suggesting that a 
right frontoparietal network is responsible for self-referential encoding (Uddin et 
al., 2007). 
Self-generated action results in sensory gating that is not 
seen in response to passive or observed movement 
Passive finger tapping was associated with increased activity in the right parietal 
operculum and bilateral anterior parietal cortex compared to self-generated finger 
tapping. The reduced response to the active condition has been referred to as 
sensory gating' (Blakemore et al., 2001). We confirm this effect in relation to 
observed versus executed actions using fMRI. A study using 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) came to the opposite conclusion, namely that 
activity in SI I is suppressed during observed movement, but that study differed 
quite markedly in design, and so is difficult to compare directly with the present 
study (Avikainen, 2002); subjects were able to see their own hand whilst 
observing the hand action of others. This visual information is likely to have a 
top-down effect on agency. 
Blakemore and colleagues (1998) interpret suppression of sensory activity during 
self-generated tactile stimulation to reflect sensorimotor matching between 
predicted and actual sensory consequences of an event; that is, if the predicted 
sensory consequence of a self-generated event (corollary discharge) matches 
the actual sensory consequence (reafference), somatosensory activity is 
suppressed and awareness of the sensory consequence is reduced. Our data 
confirmed this finding in a simple motor task, and furthermore showed the same 
effect in relation to observation of the same motor task. I propose that increased 
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activity in parietal operculum during externally produced events (Observe and 
Passive) relative to internally generated events (Execute) is the signal, or a 
component of it, that maintains the sense of agency. 
Cerebellar efference copy? 
Active finger tapping was associated with greater activity in the right cerebellum 
and basal ganglia compared to passive finger tapping. This confirms previous 
findings investigating self-produced tactile stimulation (Blakemore et al., 1998) 
and movements (IVIenon et al., 1998) versus externally produced sensations. 
This further supports theories of cerebellar forward control, which stipulate that 
the cerebellum is the generator of the efference copy, along with the motor 
command (see Ramnani, 2006). However, although Blal^emore and colleagues 
(1999) infer that sensory gating of self-produced sensations in sensory cortices is 
driven by a cerebellar system, there are confounds in that the cerebellum is 
Icnown to play an important role in perception (Bueti et al., 2008; Fierro et al., 
2007; Lee et al., 2007) and the timing of temporal intervals in repetitively 
performed actions (Ivry et al., 2002). The present study unavoidably incorporated 
the same confounds, and so the observed cerebellar activity can be interpreted 
in a number of ways, only one being that it reflects the formation of a motor 
efference copy. 
Parietal cortex and inferior frontal gyri respond to observing 
a static hand: not a true mirror response. 
The intransitive movement investigated in the present study elicited a mirror 
response in parietal operculum but not in motor or parietal areas. This is in 
contrast to some human electrophysiological data, but in accord with the original 
data from macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) and previous data 
described in this thesis. The role of inferior frontal gyrus (IPG) in the mirror 
neurone network is debated. IVIirror responses in macaque P5 have contributed 
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to the expectation of a mirror response in human IPG. Many studies purporting to 
investigate mirror responses have only studied observation of an action without 
including a study of the response to execution of that action; that is, the studies 
have only completed one half of the experiment. Purther, few studies have 
controlled for the response to observing a static limb, which resulted in activity in 
the left IPG relative to observation of a plain background in the present study. 
Those that employed a similar control have made the same observation (Grezes 
et a!., 2003; lacoboni et al., 1999). This is not surprising, in view of the studies 
reporting neurons in the IPG firing in response to object recognition (Pigarev et 
al., 1979; Rosenkilde et al., 1981). 
Similarly, there have been previous reports of mirror responses in inferior parietal 
cortices during object-directed action, (Avikainen, 2002; Grezes et al., 2003), and 
premotor cortex (Grezes et al., 2003). It has been thought that these parietal 
activations within the mirror network encode transformation of visual information 
into motor representations; as seen, for example, in studies of encoding 
information about an object (Pagg and Arbib, 1998) or of visually-guided reaching 
(Colby, 1998; Prey et al., 2005; Galletti et al., 2003). In the present study, inferior 
parietal activity was seen during observation of a static limb and thus, like the 
response of the inferior frontal gyrus, does not qualify as a true mirror response. 
The absence of inferior parietal involvement outside the operculum reflects the 
intransitive nature of the action. 
Concluding remarks 
This is the first functional imaging study that has investigated dissociations and 
associations of activity during executed, observed and passive hand movements. 
I have demonstrated that activity in caudolateral parietal operculum encodes the 
mirror response and that activity in distinct rostromedial parietal operculum 
encodes the agent. These data may have implications for patients suffering from 
specific agency deficits, such as echolalia or echopraxia, where mere perception 
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of a motor event is sufficient to initiate a self-generated act (Williams et a/., 
2006). 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Summary of findings 
This thesis aimed to investigate the relationship between action execution and 
action perception in the human brain. There is increasing evidence that 
experienced events and perceived events are commonly encoded in both human 
and non-human primate brain. These experiments have sought to identify the 
most lil^ ely candidate regions of the human brain that may contain mirror 
neurones (Experiment 1). I have designed an experiment that is as closely based 
on the non-human primate literature as possible, and that has employed novel 
analytical methods to allow me to look at subvoxel patterns of activity (Chapter 
3). In the second experiment, I investigated whether the human mirror responses 
that I identified may have been an arbitrary consequence of paired associations 
between observed and executed events (Chapter 4). These data demonstrated 
that the processing of interacting with an unfamiliar object activated bilateral 
anterior intraparietal cortices. This I interpreted as evidence that the mirror 
response is influenced by object familiarity, which was evidence against arbitrary 
paired associations (when activity would have been greater for familiar objects). 
The question I address in Experiment 3 related to maintaining the agent in a 
system that is active during both self and non-self generated events; in other 
words, if a widespread network of regions are active during action execution and 
observation, how do we distinguish the agent of the two actions? These data 
indicated that neighbouring regions within parietal operculum dissociated 
between the mirror response, and a system which ascribes agency to an event. 
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Meaningless, meaningful and object-directed actions engage 
different sensorimotor mirror responses 
Transitive action and mirror responses in premotor and parietal 
cortex 
The human 'mirror response' or action execution/observation matching system, 
comprises a network of areas including premotor, parietal and somatosensory 
cortices. These experiments were guided by the definition of true mirror neurones 
as originally described in studies on non-human primates. There were clearly 
problems of scale, as mirror neurones were discovered using single cell 
recordings. In an attempt to deal with the problem of scale, I used subvoxel 
spatial patterns to look for underlying pattern correlations. Although this is only a 
partial solution, it was a step closer to defining the human mirror system in terms 
of activity common to observation and execution of an action within the same 
volume of cortex. At the very least, human mirror neurones can only exist if this 
common activity was observed. This is described in Chapter 3; however, as is 
apparent from Chapter 4 and 5, the nature of the action influences the outcome. 
Across Experiments 1, 2 and 3 (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), I employed a range of 
actions, including meaningful object grasp, meaningless object grasp, 
meaningless non-object directed wave, and meaningless finger movements. Of 
all of these actions, only object-directed action elicited a mirror response in 
premotor and parietal regions (Figure 23). A hand wave or finger movements did 
not. This is in accord with the non-human primate literature (Gallese et ai., 1996; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1996) and may explain inconsistencies in previous studies 
(Dinstein et al., 2008; Etzel et al., 2008). Thus, it is not the fact that the object 
has meaning or semantic associations, but it is the presence of the object that 
engages this system. This highlights the role of vision in action; object-directed 
actions almost never occur in the absence of vision. In contrast, non-object 
directed actions are often made in the absence of a visual cue, or visual 
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feedback. I suggest that this dissociation underlies the stark difference in mirror 
responses for object- and non-object-directed actions. 
Unfamiliar 
objwt grasp 
Familiar 
object grasp 
intransitive 
hand wave 
Hngsrtap ; 
Figure 23. Different types of action influence the extent and location of the 
mirror response 
Mirror responses for four different types of actions are displayed. Transitive 
actions in general were associated with widespread significant activity in bilateral 
premotor and parietal cortices. This is seen in figures a and b. The right panel of 
figure a displays the comparison of interaction with an unfamiliar compared to a 
familiar object. Mirror response in bilateral IPS was specific for the interaction 
with the unfamiliar object (Fig a), whereas the premotor activity was specific for 
object-directed action. Premotor activity did not discriminate between interactions 
with familiar and unfamiliar objects. In contrast, intransitive movements did not 
elicit a mirror response in parietal or premotor areas (Fig c). This is clear in the 
direct comparisons between unfamiliar, familiar and intransitive actions (far right). 
The same applies to simple intransitive finger movements. There was a mirror 
response in secondary somatosensory cortex. Presumably this reflects a 
somatosensory rather than a motor mirror response. 
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The other type of action which has not been addressed in these experiments is 
meaningful non-object-directed actions, such as a 'thumbs up' sign or the 
universal sign for scissors. These actions play a large role in social interactions, 
and they are rarely carried out in social isolation. For example, as I sit here 
typing, my actions also include sequential actions when I grasp my mug of tea, 
grasp my pen, etc., but at no point do I make meaningful non-object-directed 
actions such as a hand wave or an OK sign. These non-object-directed actions 
are communicative. For humans with healthy vision, the majority of their actions 
when alone (and a large part of their actions when not alone) will be object-
directed. 
Object familiarity in premotor and parietal cortex: motor priming? 
The mirror response in premotor cortex is present whether the object is 
recognisable or not (Figure 24). However, the mirror response in parietal cortex 
is stronger when the object is unfamiliar. I interpret this as evidence of the 
response of cells in IPS that respond to object affordance (IVIurata et al., 2000). It 
is unclear how these cells respond to familiar and unfamiliar objects. It seems 
plausible that they encode object familiarity at some level. There is abundant 
evidence to suggest that the visual presentation of an object evokes a motor 
priming effect. For example, a number of studies have demonstrated that viewing 
a congruent object affects subsequent action execution (Craighero et al., 2002; 
Craighero et al., 1999; Ellis and Tucker, 2000). There is no reason to presume 
that a motor priming effect would differ in the context of familiar and unfamiliar 
objects, so it is unlikely that this effect underlies this result. However, the 
increased mirror response in IPS during unfamiliar object interaction may be 
linked to this priming effect in some way. Ellis and Tucker (1998) have suggested 
that the motor priming effect relies on the dorsal visual stream, so with my study 
design I can exclude a priming effect. However, if this were the case, it remains 
unclear as to why this effect should be stronger for an unfamiliar object, for which 
there is no associated action, and thus presumably reduced opportunity for motor 
priming. 
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Object direcled action 
(unfamiliar > familiar) 
Object direaed acbon 
(irrespective of ^ miliarity) 
All actions 
including intransitive 
fin^r movements 
Figure 24. Summary characteristics of human mirror networit 
The three functional imaging studies described in this thesis have revealed a 
number of characteristics about the human mirror system. The network 
comprises bilateral parietal and premotor areas; none of the experiments 
demonstrates mirror activity in STS, and so I confirm that this area appears only 
to encode visual information. Secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) is active 
during observation and execution of actions, but is not specific to object-directed 
action. Thus, I conclude it is encoding a somatosensory mirror response as has 
been previously demonstrated during observation and perception of tactile 
stimuli. According to the definition of a mirror neurone from the nonhuman 
primate literature, only the premotor and parietal regions display mirror 
responses. My first experiment demonstrates that within these regions, there are 
highly significant spatial patterns of activity, and these are greater for transitive 
compared to intransitive actions. My second experiment demonstrated that whilst 
premotor mirror regions are active for all types of object-directed action (familiar 
and unfamiliar objects), the parietal component of this network was significantly 
more active for interactions with unfamiliar objects. 
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Whilst I have not addressed meaningful intransitive action, others have, and the 
findings are inconsistent. Ferrari and colleagues (2003) reported the existence of 
mirror neurones in F5 of macaque monl<eys which responded during the 
observation and execution of ingestive (object-directed) and communicative 
actions (non-object-directed). If mirror neurones and the human mirror system 
are truly involved in motor simulation one would predict that they would be active 
for meaningful non-object-directed action. However, studies in humans have not 
supported this hypothesis (Dinstein, Gardner et a/., 2008; Dinstein et a/., 2007). 
Together, my experiments indicate that as the meaning of an action increases 
activity within the mirror system also increases. For example, simple finger 
movements and intransitive movements that do not convey any meaning were 
associated with a min-or response in secondary somatosensory cortex (Sll). 
During whole arm meaningless intransitive movements, on the other hand, mirror 
responses were seen in additional areas, including parietal and premotor cortex. 
Furthermore, goal-directed arm movements resulted in increased activity in these 
frontoparietal areas. This, I interpret, as characteristic of a networl< involved in 
extracting meaning from observed actions. 
Speculations on Simulation Theory 
These data have clear implications for claims that higher cognition relies on 
motor simulation. I have shown that human mirror responses differ greatly 
between object- and non-object-directed actions. A system for motor simulation 
would not be expected to dissociate between these actions, as both are central 
features of human behaviour. These data, and data from studies on macaque 
monlceys, indicate that mirror responses are specific to object-directed action. In 
addition to this, Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) have pointed out that motor 
simulation must be supplemented by contextual information, which can be 
provided by an object. So perhaps motor simulation, relying on mirror neurones 
or mirror responses, is possible when there is sufficient contextual information to 
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make inferences about observed actions. It may be that for intransitive actions, 
where no object affordance is present, motor simulation is not sufficient for action 
inferences and other mechanisms are required. 
The role of sensorimotor cortices in maintaining the agent 
My data indicated that sensory cortices play a role in discriminating agency. Data 
from Experiment 3 indicated that even in meaningless finger movements, a part 
of Sll displayed a response that distinguished action execution from action 
observation. Furthermore, I reported increased activity in Sll during observing a 
finger tap but not during executing. This may reflect the suppression of sensory 
consequences to self-generated events, a phenomenon known as sensory gating 
(Blakemore et al., 1999). Sensory gating is thought to play a role in signalling the 
agent of an event, but again it is unclear whether gating drives this system or 
whether gating is a downstream effect of a system which signals agency. 
Functional connectivity may help to answer this question. 
The debated mirror response in inferior frontal gyrus 
Mirror neurones reside in F5 of the macaque premotor cortex. It has been 
suggested that F5 is the precursor of Broca's area (BA44 and 45) in the human 
brain (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998). This remains a topic under debate (Morin 
and Grezes, 2008). On the basis that Broca's area is the seat of language', and 
F5 might be the precursor of Broca's area, it has been widely suggested that 
mirror neurones may be a vital component in language acquisition. Speech 
production, like many other intransitive actions, is a communicative act. A 
number of imaging studies have claimed that mirror activity can be seen in 
Broca's area; yet I did not confirm this in any of my three fMRI experiments. 
I argue that the reason for this is that true mirror responses are not present in 
Broca's area, by which I mean a response to both observation and execution, a 
requirement that has been met in few other studies. There are only a few imaging 
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studies that have employed both execution and observation conditions. One is 
the earliest by Grezes and colleagues (2003), who reported no mirror response 
in IPG. Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis of 23 imaging studies reported that 
observation of goal-directed actions was associated with activity in BA6/premotor 
cortex, rather than BA44 of the inferior frontal gyrus (Morin and Grezes, 2008). 
This is interpreted as evidence that the true mirror response originates from 
premotor cortex and that premotor cortex may be the actual homologue of F5. 
Broca's area contains the motor representation for both hand and mouth 
(Binkofski and Buccino, 2004; Krams et a/., 1998), so it is no surprise that this 
area is active during execution. The question remains as to why previous studies 
have reported activity in IPG during action perception. It may be that IPG activity 
occurs during imitation; that is, simultaneous execution and observation (Grezes 
et a!., 2003; lacoboni et a/., 1999) rather than execution or observation alone. 
Alternatively, it is plausible that observing an action for subsequent imitation may 
elicit activity in this region. 
How do these data fit in with the existing literature? 
Previous literature on the human 'mirror' system is widespread. IVIost of these 
papers do not address the issue of human mirror neurones, as they only 
investigate activity in sensorimotor and prefrontal cortices in response to 
observed actions (that is, they neglect the fact that mirror neurones are motor 
neurones, and thus by definition must be active during both action observation 
and action execution). Of the few studies that address this question, my data are 
in accord. Dinstein and colleagues (2007) used a repetition suppression 
paradigm, and found the same premotor and parietal areas involved in the mirror 
response. They report activity in visual cortices during execution conditions, 
despite the absence of visual feedback. They interpreted this as an effect of 
motor imagery. I demonstrated a similar effect in visual cortices (not shown in 
this thesis) during the finger-tapping task, the only of my execution conditions to 
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be carried out in the absence of visual feedback. This highlights a limitation of 
defining the mirror system on the basis of behaviourally-induced responses in an 
fMRI experiment. One of my concerns is that many previous fMRI studies that 
have reported 'mirror responses' have used an uncritical interpretation of the 
results. Whilst, I have encountered similar difficulties, I have been aware of these 
limitations, and taken them into account when interpreting my results. There 
remains a divide between functional imaging results in humans and single cell 
recordings in monkeys that has not been fully bridged. For example, a 
widespread theory is that the human mirror system is dysfunctional in autism. To 
my knowledge, no study has actually looked at mirror responses in this patient 
group. Instead, studies have looked at BOLD responses during observation of 
emotional faces (Dapretto et al., 2006) or at EEG recordings during action 
observation (Oberman et al., 2005). Whilst these studies may tell us something 
interesting about abnormal processing of visual stimuli in these patients, relying 
on an interpretation that encompasses human mirror neurones is, in my opinion, 
unwarranted. 
Relying on cognitive subtractions 
My experimental design relies on the assumption that it is possible to control for 
visual processing using cognitive subtraction. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the 
execute conditions were done under visual guidance: subjects could see their 
own hands whilst executing the action. Thus, it could be argued that premotor 
and parietal activity during the execute conditions is due to cells that are active in 
response to visual stimuli only, as opposed to cells that are active during visual 
and motor processing. 
To control for this confound, I used a high level baseline to control for the effect 
of seeing one's own limb. My mirror responses were, therefore, produced by 
looking at significant voxels in both [Observe object grasp - Observe other 
action] and [Execute object grasp - Execute other action]. It can still be argued 
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that this type of cognitive subtraction is insufficient to control for the visual 
processing in the Execute condition. It is difficult to see how one might design an 
experiment without this confound. For the simple movements, such as finger 
tapping, the actions were carried out in the absence of visual feedbaclc. It is 
neither feasible nor natural to ask subjects to carry out a goal-directed action 
involving object manipulation in the absence of visual feedback. Although I 
considered this approach at the start of my Ph.D. research, it soon became 
apparent that this approach was inappropriate. As with many functional imaging 
studies, the 'problem with cognitive subtraction' (Friston et al., 1996) remains, 
and this can only be countered by consistent findings across a range of studies 
employing a variety of experimental designs. 
A speculation on human mirror neurones 
Using functional iVIRI, it is currently not possible to identify the activity of single 
cells. Despite the use of multivoxel pattern analysis, I was, of course, unable to 
draw conclusions about the response of individual neurones. However, I tried to 
get as close to answering the question of human mirror neurones as is possible 
using this non-invasive imaging method. TMS suffers from a similar problem; 
although the technique directly probes neuronal function, it only does so for a 
large population of neurones simultaneously. It certainly cannot determine 
whether single cells are involved in both action execution and observation. The 
only way to get beyond these problems is to record from individual cells in the 
human brain. This has been done a number of times with respect to other forms 
of sensory processing such as pain processing (Hutchison et al., 1999) but no 
study has reported the existence of human mirror neurones in parietal or frontal 
cortices as in the macaque. 
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Future directions; implications for patients 
These data indicated that action perception and action execution are closely 
linked. It is still unclear whether this coupling has a functional role in the brain 
and, if so, what that role may be. One way to address this question would be to 
look at the system in clinical populations. For example, following stroke patients 
may suffer from limb apraxia (See Leiguarda et a/., 2000), a selective deficit in 
the execution of purposeful actions (gestures). The data presented in this thesis 
indicates that these patients may have an accompanying perceptual deficit. If 
action execution and action observation are so closely linked, selective motor 
deficits may well be accompanied by selective deficits to action perception. A 
handful of studies have indicated this is the case for a subset of patients (Cubelli 
et al., 2006; Pazzaglia et a/., 2008; Rothi et al., 1985). However, limb apraxia is a 
varied condition, which can be divided into subtypes according to deficits (See 
Leiguarda et al., 2000, Green, 2005). It would be very interesting to look at 
whether the same actions affected in the execution domain are affected in the 
perceptual domain; if a patient has a selective deficit for executing transitive 
actions such as pen grasping, does (s)he also display a corresponding selective 
deficit during perception? This would provide evidence that motor skills directly 
affect perception of motor events. 
In the most recent study of action perception in apraxia, Agliotti and colleagues 
(2008) report that of the 21 patients studies, only 56% were seen to have a 
gesture recognition deficit. Thus another useful approach would be to look at 
which cortical regions are preserved when these patients do not present with a 
perceptual deficit (Agnew et al., 2008). 
These data may be relevant to patients with psychotic symptoms, such as those 
with schizophrenia. There is a literature which argues that these patients should 
be divided according to their individual symptoms, as it is suggested that the 
different symptoms result from very different underlying pathologies (Frith, 1995). 
There is evidence to suggest that patients with paranoid delusions suffer from 
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theory of mind deficits (Frith et al., 1996) and deficits to motor aspects of action 
perception (Enticott et al., 2008). Patients with auditory hallucination and 
delusions of control (passivity phenomena) are thought to suffer from deficits in 
the ability to distinguish between self- and non-self-generated events (Fourneret 
et al., 2002). Thus, auditory verbal hallucinations are argued to be normal inner 
speech that is wrongly attributed to an external source (Frith 1995, Ford et al., 
2005). Finally, some rare patients suffer from echolalia or echopraxia, a tendency 
to repeat or imitate speech or actions. 
There is an interesting overlap in the conclusions of this thesis and this last 
paragraph. IVIy data, along with previous studies, have highlighted a system 
which may play a role in understanding observed actions, a disorder of which 
might lead to paranoid delusions. This could be the result of an impaired ability to 
interpret observed actions. My data indicated that the same frontoparietal mirror 
system is implicated in maintaining the agent throughout action execution and 
observation. A deficit in maintaining agency has been implicated in hallucinations 
and delusions (Frith, 1995). As yet, no study has looked at action 
execution/observation matching in echolalia and echopraxia, but it can be 
conjectured that a deficit to the system may result in such symptoms. If action 
observation (or perception) results in activation of appropriate motor schemata, 
normally in the absence of overt movement, presumably there is either a frontal 
inhibitory system preventing the execution of this motor schemata, or the motor 
representation is only activated to a subthreshold level. Either way, a deficit to 
the system may result in a situation where mere perception of an action or 
speech could trigger the execution of that action. Thus it would be of great 
interest to look at whether action execution/perception matching is affected in 
these patient groups. I would predict a dissociation between how the system is 
affected according to the presence of specific psychotic symptoms. 
Another potential method for investigating the functional role of the system 
matching action execution and observation would be to use repetitive TIVIS to 
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transiently stop activity in one part of the network whilst carrying out an action 
perception task. For example, the same approach could be applied to the 
premotor part of the mirror network, to see if this affect subjects' ability to identify 
whether an observed movement was carried out in a normal manner (i.e. 
whether the observed trajectory was normal or abnormal). The same approach 
could be used to look at to role of the parietal node within the network in action 
recognition; was the observed action correct for the object involved?. Given the 
data presented here, one might predict that premotor areas would be involved in 
perceiving object-directed actions, and parietal areas in perceiving unfamiliar 
object interactions. The difficulty within this method is that it generally produces 
very subtle deficits, and so the task involved must be very sensitive in order to 
detect this small effect. 
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Conclusions 
To conclude, the experiments described in this thesis have employed strict 
criteria, derived from macaque literature, in order to identify bilateral premotor 
and parietal cortices as the most likely candidate regions for human mirror 
neurones. I have looked at multivoxel spatial patterns within this premotor/ 
parietal network, to demonstrate that bilateral parietal regions show a similar 
spatial pattern of firing during execution and observation. This indicated that the 
same populations of cells may be involved, which lends further support to the 
idea that populations of mirror neurones exist in the human brain. This approach 
revealed an important point: that only a proportion of the 'mirror response' 
identified by the conventional fMRI analysis is accounted for by voxels with 
similar patterns of activity during Execute and Observe. In other words, not 
everything that we tend to call 'mirror response' is a reflection of true mirror 
neurone activity. These points have important implications for the design of future 
experiments looking at the human mirror system. In addition, I have highlighted 
the role of parietal operculum in maintaining the agent in this system. 
This action execution/observation system has implications not only for our 
understanding of the normal brain, but also for the understanding of neurological 
conditions such as apraxia and potentially psychiatric conditions such as 
schizophrenia. Further experiments will aid our understanding of how dysfunction 
in motor cortices may contribute to complex widespread pathologies. 
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Appendices 
MIRROR RESPONSES: ([Observe transitive - Observe intransitive] masked 
inclusiveiy by [Execute transitive - Execute intransitive]) 
BRAIN REGION HEMISPHERE X y Z Z SCORE 
Postcentral gyrus R 28 -48 56 4.94 
(Area 2, 70%) 
Postcentral gyrus L -28 -52 58 4.23 
(Area 2, 30%) 
Precentral gyrus R 28 -14 56 4.18 
(Area 6, 60%) 
Precentral gyrus L -30 -4 60 4.00 
(Area 6, 30%) 
Postcentral gyrus L -36 -38 52 3.98 
(Area 2, 50%) 
Table 1. Specific coordinates of human mirror responses in bilateral 
premotor and parietal cortices (Chapter 3) 
In order to identify a human mirror response by using fMRI, voxels commonly 
active in observing and executing transitive action were isolated. This was done 
by looking at voxels significantly activated in observing transitive action 
compared to observing intransitive action (OT - 01), inclusively masked by the 
contrast of executing a transitive action compared to intransitive action (ET - El), 
inclusive masking threshold 0.01, FDR 0.05, cluster threshold 25. This analysis 
revealed significant activity in bilateral premotor and parietal areas corresponding 
to area 2 and 6. These coordinates and z-scores are shown in Table 1. Foci of 
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maximal activation were localised using cytoarchitechtonic and probabilistic 
atlases available within SPM5 (Eickhoff et al., 2005). Coordinates are given in 
IVINI space. 
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Responses to familiar object interactions common to both observe and 
execute conditions 
([Observe familiar-baseline] inclusively masked by [Execute familiar-baseline]) 
BRAiN REGION X Y Z Z SCORE 
V5 (50%) R 48 -64 4 5.71 
Middle occipital gyrus L -22 -92 10 5.13 
BA18 (20%) 
Postcentral gyrus R 30 -38 43 4.78 
BA2 (60%) 
V5(10%) L -46 -72 -4 4.73 
IPL BA2 (30%) L -34 -44 54 4.68 
Caicarine Sulcus L -4 -90 -12 4.39 
Area 18 (60%) 
Middle frontal gyrus R 42 -4 54 4.18 
BA6 (40%) 
Thalamus L -16 -14 4 4.13 
Cerebellum R 36 -56 -22 3.72 
Lingual gyus R 16 -62 -12 3.69 
Superior temporal gyrus R 60 -32 20 3.34 
Supramarginal gyrus L -50 -28 26 3.32 
0P1 (50%) 
Precentral gyrus L -28 -8 52 3.30 
BA6 (30%) 
Cerebellum (VI) L -28 -62 -20 2.8 
6 
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Responses to an unfamiliar object common to both observe and execute 
conditions 
(Observed unfamiliar action - baseline inclusively masked by executed 
unfamiliar action - baseline) 
BIRAIN REGION HEMISPHERE X Y Z Z SCORE 
V5 (30%) R 46 
64 
2 6.52 
V5 (30%) L 
48 70 
-4 6.27 
IPL Area 2 (60%) L 
46 24 
38 5.86 
SPL Area 2 (50%) R 32 
48 
60 5.81 
Precentral gyrus L - -8 58 5.00 
Area 6 (50%) 30 
Superior frontal gyus R 24 -4 62 4.96 
Area 6 (30%) 
Precentral gyrus R 58 8 34 4.35 
Area 6 (40%) 
Area 6 (40%) L 
12 
-4 56 3.39 
MIRROR RESPONSES that are greater for an unfamiliar object compared to 
a familiar object 
(observed unfamiliar action - familiar action inclusively masked by executed 
unfamiliar action - executed familiar action) 
BRAIN REGION HEMISPHERE X Y Z Z SCORE 
Postcentral gyrus L -44 -32 48 4.09 
Area 2 (80%) 
Postcentral gyrus R 44 -28 52 3.94 
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Area 2 (90%) 
Table 2. Coordinates for mirror responses during actions with familiar and 
unfamiliar objects in the human brain (Chapter 4) 
The upper section of Table 2 displays the coordinates of significant activity that 
was seen in both Observe Familiar and Execute Familiar. This was calculated by 
carrying out a contrast of Observe Familiar- Observe baseline] inclusively 
masked by [Execute Familiar-Observe baseline]. These coordinates are in MNI 
space. The middle panel displays coordinates of significant BOLD responses 
during both Observed unfamiliar and Execute unfamiliar. Neither of these 
contrasts alone can inform us about mirror responses as they do not control for 
visual processing of a moving limb. The bottom panel of table shows mirror 
responses that are significantly greater for unfamiliar compared to familiar object 
interactions. By comparing activity common to both Execute and Observe for 
familiar and unfamiliar actions, I have controlled for visual processing. 
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'MIRROR RESPONSE' FOR FINGER TAPPING: 
(Observe - Static) inclusively masked by (Execute - Static) 
BRAIN 
REGION 
X Y Z 
SCORE 
Superior 0P1 (10%) R 62 -30 20 4.68 93 
temporal R 48 -36 22 3.44 
gyrus (SIS) 
Rolandic 0P1 (40-70%) L -42 -30 22 3.65 49 
Operculum 
Postcentral DPI (40-60%) L -54 -18 20 3.65 
gyrus 0P4 (10-20%) 
SIS DPI (40-50%) L -52 -30 20 3.52 
'EXTERNAL AGENT' FOR FINGER TAPPING: 
(Observe - Execute) inclusively masked by (Passive - Execute) 
BRAIN 
REGION 
X Y Z Z 
SCORE size 
Middle V5/IVIT L -46 -74 -2 3.52 175 
Occipital -48 -62 6 4.14 
gyrus -52 -62 6 3.08 
Inferior R 46 -68 -6 5.38 89 
temporal 
gyrus 
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Superior Area 2 (10-40%) R 22 -52 66 4.61 180 
parietal lobe Area 1 (0-20%) 
Postcentral Area 2 (70- R 26 -42 56 4.09 
gyrus 100%) 
Area 4p (10%) 
Superior Area 2 (30-50%) L -32 -44 56 3.69 87 
parietal lobe Area 1 (10-50%) 
Postcentral Area 3b (30- L -26 -36 54 2.85 
gyrus 60%) 
Area 2 (20-40%) 
Rolandic 0P1 (30-70%) R 46 -22 22 3.55 90 
operculum 0P3 (10-40%) 
STG R 54 -36 20 3.21 
Temporal L -50 8 -20 3.15 22 
pole 
Table 3. Coordinates for mirror responses during actions with familiar and 
unfamiliar objects in the human brain (Chapter 5) 
Table 3 displays coordinates of significant BOLD activity associated with 
observing and executing a finger movement (mirror response). These were 
calculated using the contrast of ([Observe-Static] inclusively masked by 
[Execute-Static]). The bottom panel displays significant; BOLD activity for a 
network that discriminates the agent of an action. This was assessed by 
comparing non-self generated events (Observe and Passive) with self-generated 
events (Execute) ([Observe-Execute] inclusively masked by [Passive- Execute]). 
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